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Abstract
The use of safety cases in certification raises the question of assurance
argument su ciency and the issue of confidence (or uncertainty) in the
argument’s claims. Some researchers propose to model confidence quan-
titatively and to calculate confidence in argument conclusions. We know
of little evidence to suggest that any proposed technique would deliver
trustworthy results when implemented by system safety practitioners.
Proponents do not usually assess the e cacy of their techniques through
controlled experiment or historical study. Instead, they present an il-
lustrative example where the calculation delivers a plausible result. In
this paper, we review current proposals, claims made about them, and
evidence advanced in favor of them. We then show that proposed tech-
niques can deliver implausible results in some cases. We conclude that
quantitative confidence techniques require further validation before they
should be recommended as part of the basis for deciding whether an
assurance argument justifies fielding a critical system.
1 Introduction
The safety case approach has been used in some industries and regula-
tory domains for many years [1]. An organization using the approach
takes ownership of the risks to be controlled by adopting an appropriate
safety management system, performing a hazard assessment, selecting
appropriate controls, and implementing these. The main di↵erence be-
tween the safety case approach and other systems safety approaches is
the use of a safety case to document hazards, controls, and the controls’
adequacy [2]. A safety case combines safety evidence such as fault tree
analysis results and test reports with an assurance argument, typically
defined as “a reasoned and compelling argument . . . that a system, ser-
vice or organisation will operate as intended for a defined application in a
defined environment” [3]. A safety case might serve many purposes. For
example, a safety case might communicate the system safety rationale
to engineers who will later modify the system. Alternatively, a safety
case might explain the safety rationale and evidence to an assessor who
must decide whether the hazard controls are adequate. Such use raises a
question: how should the assessor determine whether the argument and
its evidence are su cient?
The question of assurance argument su ciency leads to the concepts
of confidence and uncertainty in the argument’s claims. Researchers have
defined methods for reviewing assurance arguments [4, 5] and means of
associating reasoning about confidence with the parts of the assurance
argument they relate to [6,7]. Other researchers propose adopting quan-
titative models of argument from disciplines such as philosophy to the
problem of assessing confidence in assurance arguments. Some vendors
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sell tools to perform the necessary calculations [8]. But despite the im-
portance of knowing how far confidence estimates should be trusted, little
is known about whether proposed techniques for quantifying confidence
produce trustworthy results [9]. And as others have observed, the se-
ductive appearance of computational rigor might cause decision-makers
to mistakenly place trust in “superficially plausible nonsense” [10]. A
frank appraisal of the evidence for and against the e cacy of proposed
quantitative confidence techniques will be of value to safety engineers,
assessors, and regulators who must decide how to assess safety argu-
ments and interpret assessments. In this paper, we survey and assess
proposed techniques for quantifying confidence in assurance arguments.
We identify the proposers’ claims and the support given for these, pro-
vide specific counterarguments, identify common flaws in the proposals,
and assess the evidential basis for quantifying confidence.
2 Background
There is a substantial literature on safety cases, a much larger philosophi-
cal literature on argument, and a growing body of work on applying ideas
from the latter to the former.
2.1 Safety Cases
In the 1970s, the United Kingdom (UK) Committee on Safety and Health
at Work observed that prescribing specific risk reduction measures had
not ensured safety in diverse workplaces for two reasons [11]. First, pre-
scription encouraged compliance without thought, resulting in missed
opportunities for risk reduction. Second, making law or regulation takes
so much time that prescriptions were often out of date before or shortly
after they took e↵ect. (This is still true four decades later [12].) Accord-
ingly, the UK introduced the safety case process to compel operators to
conduct risk assessments, implement appropriate mitigations, adopt an
appropriate safety management plan, commission independent audits to
verify e↵ective safety management, and revisit safety as circumstances,
operations, and technology change [1,11,13]. In later decades, the safety
case process was expanded to applications such as o↵shore oil and gas
installations [13] and railway operations [14]. The safety case process is
now used in the oil and gas sector in the UK and Australia, and a similar
process is used in Norway [1]. Safety cases are used in the UK defense
sector [15], in automotive applications [16], and with some medical de-
vices in the United States [17].
Safety cases and their assurance arguments are thought to serve mul-
tiple purposes. For example, safety cases communicate safety design in-
tent to those who will modify existing systems so that safety can be
maintained during and after the change [15]. Safety cases also explain
the safety rationale and evidence to an assessor—a customer, regulatory
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agency, or third party—who uses that information to decide whether a
system is adequately safe [18–25]. Common definitions of assurance cases
call for them to be compelling [3, 15]. But if an authority is to decide
whether to accept a system based on whether its assurance argument
is compelling, that authority would need to assess the confidence that
the argument justifies and to use that assessment in a test of su ciency.
Researchers have proposed non-quantitative means of doing this [4]. But
it is commonly held that, ceteris paribus, quantitative methods produce
more trustworthy results than qualitative methods. Perhaps for this
reason, some researchers have proposed techniques for quantifying con-
fidence in assurance arguments [18–32].
2.2 The Philosophy Literature
The literature on assurance arguments draws mainly on the philosophy of
informal argumentation, particularly the work of Toulmin [33, 34]. This
literature focuses mainly on how to structure, represent, and critically
examine arguments as humans make them [33–35]. While philosophers
recognize some arguments as stronger than others, the informal argu-
mentation literature does not generally treat argument strength as a
property to be measured or calculated.
Philosophers in a di↵erent tradition have been defining logics in terms
of probability calculi for over a century [36]. Many of these approaches,
including Keynes’s, are based on Bayes’ Theorem [36, 37]. More recent
work by Dempster and Shafer has defined the Dempster–Shafer theory
of evidence [38]. Researchers have proposed applying Dempster–Shafer
theory to multiple attribute decision analysis problems; this application
is known as Evidential Reasoning [39].
We will not recount the history of these approaches or identify their
di↵erences. It su ces to observe that no consensus exists among philoso-
phers that any of these is a trustworthy means of computing confidence in
an argument so as to reliably determine whether it is su cient to justify
an action such as putting a safety-critical system into service. Proba-
bilistic logics have long been the target of criticism [40] and continue
to be updated [41]. While it might be possible for safety professionals
to use probabilistic logic to produce trustworthy estimates of confidence
in assurance claims, this cannot be inferred from what is known about
these logics. Careful, direct scientific assessment of e cacy is needed.
3 Method
Researchers have been examining techniques for quantifying confidence
in assurance arguments since the 1990s [18–32]. In this paper, we survey
and assess these proposals.
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3.1 Selection of Proposals
We identified twelve candidate proposals (in fifteen papers) using a com-
bination of web and repository searches (e.g., Google, IEEE Xplore, and
ACM Digital Library), notification services (e.g., Google Scholar Alerts
on terms such as ‘safety case’), following chains of references, and tar-
geted review of the writings of selected researchers. Some literature
surveys systematically obtain a sample of papers on a subject. This is
necessary when the proportion of selected studies reaching a given con-
clusion is used to assess the truth of that conclusion. Our literature
survey is not systematic in this sense, but we are not drawing conclu-
sions about a balance of conflicting evidence. Our primary aim was to
include as many proposals as we could find. Our secondary aim is to
arm readers with the information they need to understand the maturity
of current proposals and critically assess future proposals.
3.2 Assessment of Proposals
To assess the maturity of techniques for quantifying confidence in as-
surance cases, we first reviewed each proposal to capture (1) what its
authors hypothesize about the e cacy of that method and (2) what
evidence they provide or cite to support that hypothesis. We then at-
tempted to refute the hypothesis that each technique produces output
that is a suitable basis for making release-to-service decisions by identify-
ing a counterexample in which the technique’s output is untrustworthy.
In many of the selected papers, the authors propose a technique and
apply it to a specimen argument fragment to yield a plausible assessment
of confidence. To predict whether a technique’s output will be trustwor-
thy in a proposed application, one needs to know whether the output
is known to be correct in all or most similar applications. A single ex-
ample cannot show this, but a single counterexample can cast doubt on
it. Since the burden of proving that a technique is e↵ective lies with
its proposers, the absence of su cient evidence undercuts conclusions of
e cacy. Nevertheless, we also attempted to find a counterexample for
each technique.
To ensure that we understood the authors’ proposals and applied
them correctly, we began by attempting to reproduce their examples
(if given). We then attempted to find a counterexample for which the
proposed technique produces an implausible result. Where possible, our
counterexamples are variants of the original examples. The techniques
we survey require analysts to supply input such as the choice of aggre-
gation rules, weighting and scaling factors, and likelihood data. Strict
guidelines for these parameters are not supplied and might be impossi-
ble to furnish. By using similar argument structures, weights, and input
data, we reduce the risk of misapplying the technique. For example,
suppose a technique provides multiple rules for aggregating confidence
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from premises to assess confidence in a conclusion. Using the same rule
the authors used for a given reasoning step eliminates the possibility of
undermining the purported counterexample by claiming a di↵erent rule
should have been used.
The existence of a counterexample demonstrates that a technique
cannot be trusted to produce acceptable output in all cases and raises
the e↵ective the burden of proof for proponents. For example, a propo-
nent might hypothesize that a technique, while imperfect, nevertheless
produces better output on average than plausible alternatives. But such
a hypothesis cannot be confirmed by worked examples; controlled exper-
iments or historical studies are needed.
Our counterexamples also provide value beyond assessing the identi-
fied quantitative confidence techniques: they arm readers with patterns
for critically examining other such proposals. When assessing a new
quantitative confidence technique, we suggest that readers begin their
evaluation by determining whether it produces plausible output for the
extreme cases that we make use of.
4 Results
Table 1 lists the twelve selected proposals for quantifying confidence in
assurance cases. In this section, we briefly summarize each, identify
the hypotheses and evidence for e cacy put forward by their authors,
and give our counterarguments. We present detailed descriptions of each
proposed technique, the claims made about them, the evidence for these,
and our counterargument in Appendices A–L.
4.1 The Proposed Techniques
Of the twelve techniques we identified, five are based on Bayesian Belief
Networks (BBNs), six are based on Dempster–Shafer Theory, Jøsang’s
Opinion Triangle, or Evidential Reasoning, and one makes use of weighted
averages. In this section, we briefly introduce each in turn.
4.1.1 Techniques Based on Bayesian Belief Networks
In techniques based on Bayesian Belief Networks, the analyst constructs
a network of nodes using a BBN tool. Each node represents a variable
and the absence of an arrow from one node to another indicates inde-
pendence. The analyst supplies probability data for the leaf nodes and
conditional probability tables or formulae for non-leaf nodes. The BBN
tool then computes the probability of the non-leaf nodes, including the
node representing the safety claim of interest.
Denney, Pai, and Habli. Denney, Pai, and Habli propose to compute
uncertainty in a safety claim by constructing a BBN that roughly mirrors
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Table 1: Selected techniques for quantifying confidence in assurance arguments.
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the structure of a safety argument [28]. Each leaf node represents a
source of uncertainty in the safety argument. The leaf node’s value
encodes the analyst’s confidence (derived from “both quantitative data
. . . [and] qualitative means”) on a five-point scale from Very Low to Very
High. The paper gives an example in which a node labeled Proof Correct
represents confidence in a proof used to verify software. Non-leaf nodes
are computed as the weighted average of the nodes from which they
derive their value. The paper gives an example in which Computation
Correct is the weighted average of Specification Correct and Proof Correct.
See Appendix C for details.
Guo. Guo proposes representing safety arguments as BBNs [30]. The
BBN replaces representations of the safety argument such as diagrams
in Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [3]. The paper gives an example
in which “quality of safety function requirement” depends on “omis-
sion,” “misunderstanding,” “conflict,” and the “quality of overall safety
requirement.” See Appendix F for details.
Hobbs and Lloyd. Hobbs and Lloyd propose representing assurance
arguments as BBNs “where each leaf . . . represents elementary evidence
and the network’s structure represents the argument” [20]. They re-
fer to the SafEty and Risk Evaluation using bayesian NEts (SERENE)
manual [23] for patterns but suggest that their noisy-or and noisy-and
functions might model assurance case reasoning better than simple or
and and functions. See Appendix G for details.
The SERENE Partners. The partners of the Safety and Risk Eval-
uation Using Bayesian Nets (SERENE) project propose using BBNs to
model system safety and compute risk [23]. The SERENE method man-
ual defines a number of idioms (patterns) that the analyst uses to model
the system in question. See Appendix I for details.
Zhao, Zhang, Lu, and Zeng. Zhao, Zhang, Lu, and Zeng propose
to calculate confidence using BBNs [25]. The analyst (1) interprets an
existing assurance argument as a sequence of Toulmin arguments [34],
(2) creates a BBN by instantiating a given pattern for each instance,
(3) supplies the requisite probability data, and (4) uses a BBN tool to
compute the resulting confidence in safety. See Appendix L for details.
4.1.2 Techniques Based on Dempster–Shafer Theory, Jøsang’s
Opinion Triangle, or Evidential Reasoning
Approaches based on Dempster–Shafer theory di↵er from Bayesian ap-
proaches in that they reason about both the strength of belief in opinions
and the plausibility of those opinions. This adds a second dimension to
the assessment of each claim in a safety case. Jøsang’s opinion triangle,
7
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Figure 1: Jøsang’s opinion triangle redefines Dempster–Shafer theory’s belief
and plausibility measures in terms of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty [42].
illustrated in Figure 1, reimagines the two dimensional space as three
dimensions: belief, disbelief, and uncertainty [42]. As belief, disbelief, or
uncertainty grows, the other two attributes must shrink. Evidential rea-
soning is an approach to using Dempster–Shafer theory in multi-attribute
decision problems [39].
Ayoub, Chang, Sokolsky, and Lee. Ayoub, Chang, Sokolsky, and
Lee propose to compute the su ciency of an existing safety arguments
using Dempster–Shafer theory [18]. The analyst first assesses the suf-
ficiency and insu ciency of item of evidence cited by the safety case.
The analyst then uses aggregation rules to compute the su ciency and
insu ciency of each claim in the safety argument, working from evidence
toward the main safety claim. See Appendix A for details.
Cyra and Go´rski. Cyra and Go´rski propose to evaluate confidence in
assurance cases using Dempster–Shafer theory. The analyst first creates
an argument comprising a series of claims supported by arguments, war-
rants, and premises. Each premise is another claim, a fact supported by
evidence, or an assumption. The analyst then assesses each assumption,
fact, and warrant in terms of Jøsang’s opinion triangle. The analyst
finally identifies the type of each argument step, selects the appropri-
ate formulae from those provided by the authors, and computes belief,
disbelief, and uncertainty in each claim. See Appendix B for details.
Duan, Rayadurgam, Heimdahl, Sokolsky, and Lee. Duan, Raya-
durgam, Heimdahl, Sokolsky, and Lee propose using the beta distribution
and Jøsang’s opinion triangle to model uncertainty in assurance case ev-
idence [19]. The analyst first expresses an opinion about evidence cited
by an existing assurance argument in terms of Jøsang’s opinion trian-
gle then uses the beta distribution and Jøsang’s formulae to compute
opinions in the argument’s claims. See Appendix D for details.
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Guiochet, Hoang, and Kaaˆniche. Guiochet, Hoang, and Kaaˆniche
propose a technique for assessing confidence in an existing assurance case
using Dempster–Shafer theory [29]. The technique models confidence in
a conclusion as the strength of belief that the conclusion is true and
defines uncertainty as the lack of belief that the conclusion is either
true or false, but rules out disbelief (which presumably should not be
included in the argument). The authors propose aggregation rules for
various kinds of argument steps. See Appendix E for details.
Nair, Walkinshaw, Kelly, and de la Vara. Walkinshaw, Kelly, and
de la Vara propose to use Evidential Reasoning (ER) to calculate belief
in safety claims [21,22,31]. The proposed technique focuses on assessing
the evidence cited by an existing safety argument. The analyst answers
a series of questions specific to the type of evidence and a tool both
(i) instantiates a GSN pattern depicting the reasons for having confidence
in the claim supported by the evidence and (ii) calculates that confidence
using Evidential Reasoning rules. See Appendix H for details.
Zeng, Lu, and Zhong. Zeng, Lu, and Zhong propose using Dempster–
Shafer theory to assess the confidence in arguments recorded in GSN [3,
24]. The proposed technique defines confidence on a five-point Likert
scale and uses an improved Dempster’s rule to assess confidence in con-
clusions. See Appendix K for details.
4.1.3 Other Techniques
One of the papers we selected proposes an approach that does not use
BBNs, Dempster–Shafer theory, Jøsang’s opinion triangle, or Evidential
Reasoning.
Yamamoto. Yamamoto proposes annotating GSN assurance arguments
with attributes and using these to evaluate architectures “for quality
claims, such as security and safety” [32]. In the proposed technique,
analysts rate GSN solutions on a five-point Likert scale from strongly
unsatisfied to strongly satisfied. The technique defines the assessment of
a GSN goal as the weighted average of its supporting goals and solutions.
See Appendix J for details.
4.2 Hypotheses
None of the selected papers formally defines a research hypothesis (e.g.,
using a sentence containing the word ‘hypothesis’ or notation such as
H0). But all of the papers begin with an introduction that describes and
motivates the work. In this section, we characterize the hypotheses that
we infer from the papers’ narratives.
All selected papers assert the need for a reviewer to determine how
much confidence in a safety claim an assurance argument should justify.
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The papers for seven of the twelve techniques describe this assessment
as the basis for determining whether a system is safe enough to field.
While the papers for six techniques present conclusions that imply lim-
ited maturity, the papers for the remaining six make stronger claims.
The papers for five techniques hypothesize that the techniques will help
analysts make more accurate assessments than they could with unaided
reason. And the papers presenting five techniques hypothesize that the
technique better communicates the safety argument to stakeholders than
alternatives.
4.2.1 The Purposes of Confidence Assessment
The selected papers related to eight techniques present them in a manner
that suggests that those techniques are to be used to assess whether sys-
tems are safe or secure enough to deploy [18–24,29–31] (see Appendices
A, D–I, and K):
• The paper about one technique motivates it by asserting that “the
objective of safety case development . . . is to facilitate mutual
acceptance [among system stakeholders] of [a] subjective [safety
claim]” [18]. Quantitative confidence assessment aids this mutual
acceptance by “answering a question about the overall su ciency
of the argument.”
• A paper about another technique notes that “certain safety critical
systems must be demonstrated to be safe and certified or approved
by some regulatory body before they are allowed to be taken into
operation or sold to the general public” and that this raises the
question of confidence in the systems’ assurance cases [19].
• The paper about a third technique begins by noting that “when im-
plementing a safety- or mission-critical application, it is necessary
to convince the authors, the management of the development com-
pany, potential customers and auditors that the system meets its
safety, availability and reliability requirements” and hypothesizes
that BBNs are a means of doing this [20].
• The paper about a fourth technique begins with the observation
that “safety cases are used in several critical industrial sectors to
justify safety of installations and operations” (to unspecified stake-
holders) and then notes that “an important and growing issue is
to understand how much confidence one could have in the [safety]
claim” [29].
• The paper about a fifth technique asserts that “BBN provides a
reasonable frame to quantitatively evaluate the fulfilling quality of
the requirements in safety standards” and “obtain the confidence
of a system, e.g., to provide a quantitative figure about systematic
failure rate” [30].
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• A paper about a sixth technique begins by noting that “goal-based
system safety standards such as [UK Defence Standard] 00-56 . . .
often require the construction and provision of a safety case” and
notes that as a result “the assessor needs to establish confidence
that the safety case adequately addresses the identification and
mitigation of hazards” [15, 21]. Two more papers about the same
technique note that “it is often left to the human assessor to decide
whether or not the presented evidence is su cient to support the
safety claims made in the case” [22,31].
• The manual about a seventh technique notes that “the justification
of safety, sometimes called a safety case, may be submitted to safety
regulators for approval” [23].
• A paper about an eighth technique notes in its introduction that
“the acceptance of a safety case requires the assessors to be confi-
dent that the safety case meets [its] requirements” [24].
The paper presenting an additional technique does not state how
confidence assessment is to be used save to note that an “overarching
motivation for this work is, eventually, to integrate it into a quantitative
framework for risk analysis” [28] (see Appendix C). The paper present-
ing another technique notes that “assurance cases support consensus
building process” but defines the aim of the technique as “help[ing] en-
gineers develop safety critical . . . system architectures quickly” [32] (see
Appendix J). The papers presenting the remaining two techniques as-
sert the need to assess confidence in arguments without stating how that
assessment will be used [25,26] (see Appendices B and L):
• A paper presenting one technique notes the “necessity of expert
assessment of the compelling power of [argument] structures” but
does not explicitly connect this to release-to-service decisions [26].
• The paper presenting a third technique begins with the obser-
vation that “instead of assessing manufacturer compliance with
process-based regulations and standards, recently the industry ar-
eas have paid much attention to the assurance cases which focused
on demonstrating the dependability of product-specific system”
but does not elaborate on who this is demonstrated to or why [25].
4.2.2 The Maturity of the Proposed Techniques
The selected papers about six techniques present conclusions in a manner
consistent with a technique that is still being developed or assessed [18,
19,22,25,28,29] (see Appendices A, C–E, H, and L):
• The paper presenting one proposed technique notes that the un-
derlying theory’s assumption of evidence independence is often vi-
olated in safety arguments and proposes future work to account for
this dependence [18].
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• The paper presenting another technique describes assessment of
the proposed technique as a “preliminary investigation” [28].
• The paper presenting a third technique notes that it discusses only
two probabilistic operators and suggests examining others in future
work [19].
• The paper presenting a fourth technique “focus[es on] the feasibility
of a quantitative estimation of confidence” without addressing the
accuracy of that estimation [29].
• A paper about a fifth technique indicates that in the future the
authors will “further validate the completeness of the confidence
argument pattern [they present] with more checklists used in prac-
tice, . . . seek to improve the tool support, eliminate fallacies . . .
and mitigate fatigue when answering the questionnaire” used to
assess confidence in an evidence citation [22].
• A paper about a sixth technique cautiously concludes that the
proposal is “a potentially helpful way towards the measurement of
confidence in assurance cases” [25].
The selected papers about three other techniques present conclusions
that suggest that the proposed techniques are more mature [24, 27, 32]
(see Appendices B, J, and K):
• A paper presenting one technique concludes that it “has already
been fully implemented in the [authors’] tool” and “has been sub-
jected to experimental validation” with “further experiments un-
der preparation. Furthermore, the method has been applied for
appraisal of arguments for patient safety and privacy, and for ful-
filment of security requirements in two [European Union–funded]
projects. It is also going to be used in a new project utilizing ar-
gument structures to demonstrate conformity with standards and
regulations” [27].
• The paper presenting a second technique refers to the technique
as a proposal yet concludes that “discussions based on the case
study showed the e↵ectiveness and appropriateness of the proposed
method to resolve security and safety issues” and describes future
work aimed at assessing “productivity” but not e cacy [32].
• The paper presenting a third technique also describes it as proposed
yet asserts that the underlying theory “is fit for processing the
subjective judgment and synthesizing the uncertain knowledge”
and concludes that “it is proved that [Dempster–Shafer] theory has
advantages in evaluating confidence in safety case which has some
uncertainty. The usage of [Dempster–Shafer] theory reduced the
e↵ect of the uncertainty, improved the precision and the validity of
the evaluation, and reduced the blindness and the subjectivity of
evaluation of confidence in safety case” [24].
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The selected papers about the remaining three techniques present
them in a manner consistent with technology mature enough for practi-
tioners to use [20, 23,30] (see Appendices F, G, and I):
• The paper about one technique describes BBNs in a manner that
gives the impression that they are a mature technology and as-
serts that an example application shows that it is appropriate to
apply BBNs safety cases: “from this example, we show that BBN
provides a mathematically sound approach for modelling and ma-
nipulating uncertainty that is inherent in safety assessment. Specif-
ically, uncertainty can be expressed by conditional probability, and
the Bayes theory underlying BBNs therefore o↵ers them the capa-
bility to manage uncertainty” [30].
• The paper about a second technique presents BBN-based assur-
ance arguments as a technology being used in practice, reports the
authors’ experience, and concludes that “applying a BBN to rep-
resent an assurance case, when backed by a suitable computation
tool, appears to be a flexible and powerful technique” [20].
• The manual for a third technique presents detailed instructions
for using the technique and describes expected benefits without
mentioning what the evidence of e cacy is or what further research
remains to be done [23].
4.2.3 Helping Analysts Make More Accurate Assessments
The selected papers about five techniques hypothesize that those tech-
niques will help analysts to make more accurate assessments than they
could with unaided reason [18, 21, 23, 26, 28] (see Appendices A–C, H,
and I):
• A paper presenting one technique asserts that “the research in ex-
perimental psychology shows that human minds do not deal prop-
erly with complex inference based on uncertain sources of knowl-
edge,” citing a computer scientist’s paper on the subject [26, 43].
• The paper presenting a di↵erent technique cites the former paper
when making the same assertion [18].
• The paper proposing a third technique observes that “subjectiv-
ity inherent in the structure of the argument and its supporting
evidence . . . pose[s] a key challenge to the measurement and
quantification of confidence in the overall safety case” [28]. The
same paper concludes that “linking qualitative safety arguments
to quantitative arguments about uncertainty and confidence . . .
ensur[es] rigor in measuring confidence via probabilistic reasoning
using [BBNs].”
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• A paper presenting a fourth technique hypothesizes that the tech-
nique “will help safety case assessment to be more systematic and
consistent” than using another technique for reviewing arguments
expressed in GSN [21].
• The manual presenting a fifth technique asserts that it provides “a
basis for empirical validation of the beliefs of safety experts,” thus
presumably leading to more accurate assessments than they could
obtain with unaided reason [23].
The paper presenting one of the above techniques also hypothesizes
that the technique limits the impact of the analysts’ bias on their assess-
ments [18] (see Appendix A). It suggests that asking analysts’ opinions
about both the su ciency and insu ciency of evidence will counteract
confirmation bias. The paper concludes, “preliminary experience of ap-
plying the proposed method has revealed that the assessing mechanism
yields the expected benefits in guiding the safety argument reviewer and
helping him/her to reduce the e↵ect of the confirmation bias mindset.”
4.2.4 Communicating the Safety Argument
The selected papers about five techniques hypothesize that they result
in better communication of the safety argument to stakeholders than an
alternative [19–21,23,30,31] (see Appendices D and F–I):
• The paper presenting one technique hypothesizes that the beta dis-
tribution, mapped to Jøsang’s opinion triangle, better represents
human opinion than alternatives such as the truncated normal dis-
tribution [19].
• The paper presenting another technique hypothesizes that using
a BBN to represent an assurance argument provides “improved
transparency” in relation to an unspecified alternative [30].
• The paper presenting a third technique motivates a discussion of
BBN-based arguments by noting that organizing and presenting
a safety case “in an unstructured, natural language presents dif-
ficulties both to the authors of the case, who have to struggle to
maintain coherence as the case evolves, and to the auditors review-
ing it, who have to extract the threads of the argument” [20].
• A paper presenting a fourth technique asserts that it “explicitly
captures any uncertainty in the [assessor’s] judgement” [21]. A
further paper on the same technique asserts that the technique
“enables these judgements to be presented within the context of
an overall argument of confidence” [31].
• A manual presenting a fifth technique asserts that the technique
provides “improved communication of safety” and a “greater fo-
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cus on the properties which lead to safety” than an unspecified
alternative [23].
4.3 Evidence of Fitness for Use in Release-to-Service De-
cisions
As described in Section 4.2, all of the techniques described in Section 4.1
and detailed in Appendices A–L assume the need to quantify confidence
in assurance arguments. While some papers describe quantified confi-
dence assessment as part of a certification process, others do not. But
that purpose is the focus of this paper. Accordingly, this section iden-
tifies the lines of argument that best show that a quantified confidence
technique is fit for use as the basis of release-to-service decisions. The
selected papers present three such lines of argument: (1) appeal to prop-
erties of the underlying theory, (2) the Cyra and Go´rski experiment, and
(3) the Nair et al. survey.
4.3.1 Properties of the Underlying Theory
Several of the selected papers appeal to the properties of the underlying
theory. In some cases, this is simply an appeal to the theory’s quanti-
tative nature or the breath of its acceptance. For example, one paper
concludes that using BBNs “ensures rigor in measuring confidence via
probabilistic reasoning” [28]. Another reasons that because “BBNs are
based on Bayes’ theory and have a sound mathematical background,”
they “provide a quantitative figure for evaluating safety” [30]. A paper
proposing one technique explicitly identified relevant properties of the
underlying theory [22]. Citing Yang and Xu, that paper reports that the
Evidential Reasoning approach underpinning the proposed technique
obeys certain desirable axioms that ensure the following:
1. If [no premise of] y is assessed at [confidence] grade Hn,
then  n,y [(belief that y has confidence Hn)] = 0.
2. If all [premises] are assessed to a gradeHn then  n,y = 1.
3. If all [premises] are completely assessed to a subset of
evaluation grades then y should be completely assessed
to the same subset of grades.
4. If, for a [premise] z,
Pn
i=0  i,z < 1, then the same holds
for y:
Pn
i=0  i,y < 1 [22].
These properties, while desirable, are not su cient to show that the
proposed technique produces trustworthy confidence assessments. Rules
that would produce di↵erent confidence figures also satisfy these crite-
ria. For example, one might define the combination of assessments of
premises as either the categorical weaker or categorical mean of the two
assessments. (See Section H.3.)
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If an appeal to the underlying theory’s properties is to show that
a technique produces trustworthy confidence assessments, the maker of
the appeal must show that the theory’s properties entail the accuracy of
the technique’s results. None of the surveyed papers shows this.
4.3.2 The Cyra and Go´rski Experiment
The papers presenting one selected technique present the results of “an
experimental calibration and validation” of that technique [27] (see Ap-
pendix B for details). The technique uses functions that map opinions
expressed on a five-point linguistic scale (e.g., “with very high confi-
dence”) to and from the numeric forms used in computation. The au-
thors used an experiment to both derive these parameters and assess the
technique. The participants, thirty-one Master’s students, were divided
into three groups that each focused on a distinct kind of argument step.
The roughly ten subjects in each group assessed the strength of warrants,
chose weights for premises, and, given assessments of premises, assessed
strength in the conclusion. The experimenters assessed the consistency of
assessments by measuring the root-mean-squared “of the di↵erence be-
tween the first and repeated assessment (by the same participant) of the
same conclusion with the same assessments assigned to the premises.”
The experimenters also assessed the accuracy of assessments by mea-
suring the root-mean-square “of the di↵erence between a participant’s
assessment and the result of application of the [proposed technique].”
The experimental results show that individual students assess argu-
ments somewhat inconsistently: the root-mean-squared value of consis-
tency ranged between 0.62 and 1.03 of a linguistic scale category depend-
ing on the type of argument step. Individual assessments varied from
the proposed technique’s predictions by about as much: the root-mean-
squared value of accuracy ranged between 0.66 and 1.10 of a category
depending on the type of argument step.
These results are encouraging. But there are threats to validity that
limit the experiment’s strength as evidence of e cacy. Two stand out:
the problem of using the same data to both define and assess the tech-
nique, and the representativeness of the sample. The danger in using
the same data to both define and assess a technique is that the tech-
nique might be e↵ective only for the specimen problem from which it
derives. This problem can be mitigated using an approach such as n-fold
cross validation. But the papers do not mention whether or how the
experimenters addressed this problem. And it is not clear that the rea-
soning a small number of students used to assess five example argument
steps is normative for all assurance cases. Students and seasoned secu-
rity professionals might assess arguments di↵erently. The five selected
arguments of each type might not be representative of all arguments.
And it is possible that people generally assess the specimen arguments
incorrectly.
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4.3.3 The Nair et al. Survey
The papers presenting one selected technique present the results of a
survey of twenty-one safety experts [22] (see Appendix H for details).
The subjects viewed a presentation and then responded to survey ques-
tions. When asked whether “use of the approach will lead to more ac-
curate safety evidence assessments,” four strongly agreed, nine agreed,
and eight neither agreed nor disagreed.
It is not clear that the reported survey provides much support for
the hypothesis that the technique is a trustworthy basis for making
release-to-service decisions. This is in part due to weaknesses that af-
fect survey research generally: surveys are a↵ected by response biases,
including those related to demand characteristics. For example, survey
respondents sometimes feel compelled to be ‘good subjects’ by giving re-
sponses they think support the researchers’ hypothesis [44]. Researchers
can limit response bias through measures such as deliberately hiding the
hypothesis from subjects, but the papers describe no such controls.
The other main threat to validity is that respondents are not known
to be capable of accurately assessing e cacy. E cacy might depend
on subtle matters of degree such as analysts’ skill in choosing weights
and making judgments. If experimental and observational assessments of
e cacy and its contributory factors were available to respondents, their
opinions might synthesize this evidence. Without such data, it is not
clear that participants’ opinions on e cacy are a measure of e cacy.
4.4 Counterargument
As reported in Table 1, we identified counterexamples for nine of the
twelve selected techniques. In two of the remaining cases, the papers
did not present a worked example we could replicate. (See Appendices
E and F.) In the third, we replicated calculations but found the orig-
inal example unsuitable as a basis for plausible counterexamples. (See
Appendix G.) As described in Section 3.2, we derived counterexamples
from original examples so that our choices of weights and parameters
are consistent with the authors’ intent. Without an original example to
follow, we could not create counterexamples without risking these being
regarded as misapplications of the proposed technique.
Our counterexamples came in three main forms: masking missing
evidence or counterevidence, sensitivity to the arbitrary scope of hazards,
and technique-specific counterexamples. In this section, we discuss all
three forms and then report other issues we identified when assessing
the selected techniques.
4.4.1 Masking Missing Evidence or Counterevidence
When verification and validation techniques produce a result other than
the desired (safe) result, it is accepted safety practice to investigate the
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G1. All identified hazards 
eliminated/sufficiently mitigated
C1. Identified Hazards 
(H1–H21)
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. . .
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Figure 2: Our Many Hazards (with G2.2–G2.19 and Ev1.2–Ev.19 but not Ev4),
Undermined Evidence 1 (with G2.2–G2.19 and Ev1.2–Ev.19 but not Ev4), Under-
mined Evidence 2 (without G2.2–G2.19, Ev1.2–Ev.19 or Ev4) and Counter Evi-
dence (with G2.2–G2.19, Ev1.2–Ev.19, and Ev4) variants of the example safety
argument shown in Figure A1 (itself from [18]).
cause of that outcome. For example, suppose that a test fails. This
might happen for reasons other than a dangerous flaw. For example,
testers might misinterpret a requirement or perform a test procedure
incorrectly. Even if the test has revealed a flaw, it might be prudent to
live with the flaw because correcting it could introduce more dangerous
defects. But the cause of any undesired test, review, or analysis result
should be investigated before making a decision to overlook it.
We identified counterexamples for six of the twelve selected tech-
niques that demonstrate that evidence for one claim is allowed to mask
missing evidence or counterevidence for the same or di↵erent claims.
(See Table 1 and Appendices A–D, J, and K.) For example, consider
the counterexample we identified for one technique based on Dempster–
Shafer theory [18] (see Appendix A). Figure 2 depicts the argument on
which we base three variants of the original example: Many Hazards,
Undermined Evidence 1, and Counterevidence. (We will define a fourth
case, Undermined Evidence 2, in Section 4.4.2.) These arguments di↵er
from the original in two ways: (a) they show twenty-one hazards rather
than two, and (b) one has additional operational history evidence. Ta-
ble 2 gives our assessment of the su ciency, insu ciency, and uncertainty
of the evidence and the resulting computed assessment of the main safety
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Element(s) Variant Su↵. Insu↵. Uncert.
Ev1.1 All 0.800 0.100 0.100
Ev1.2–19 All but Undermined 0.800 0.100 0.100
Evidence 2
Ev1.20 Many Hazards, 0.800 0.100 0.100
Counterevidence
Undermined Evidence 0.050 0.900 0.050
1 and 2
Ev2 All 0.700 0.100 0.200
Ev3 All 0.500 0.200 0.300
Ev4 Counterevidence 0.050 0.900 0.050
G1 Many Hazards 0.801 0.101 0.099
Undermined Evidence 1 0.765 0.139 0.096
Undermined Evidence 2 0.079 0.053 0.868
Counterevidence 0.777 0.127 0.096
Table 2: The su ciency, insu ciency, and uncertainty of the evidence and
main safety claim in the example arguments shown in Figure 2.
claim, G1. In all three cases, the su ciency of the safety claim is much
higher than uncertainty in the safety claim. As a result, the proposed
technique assesses all three counterexample arguments as acceptable.
The danger of a technique producing such results is that analysts
might use those results to justify forgoing investigation of the discon-
firming evidence. This is not necessarily a fatal flaw. But this possibility
must be kept in mind when specifying how quantified confidence will be
used in the safety engineering process. In the case of these techniques,
it is insu cient to rely solely on calculated confidence in safety to judge
whether there are problems in the safety case.
4.4.2 Sensitivity to the Arbitrary Scope of Hazards
The number of significant hazards identified for a system depends on the
analysts’ choice of scope for each: one might increase the number of haz-
ards by dividing one state into two distinct substates or decrease their
number by combining two states into one. This change in scope need not
change how the hazards are managed or what evidence of their manage-
ment engineers produce. Simply the changing scope of hazards without
changing how they are managed or the evidence of their management
should not substantially a↵ect confidence in system safety.
We identified counterexamples for three of the twelve selected tech-
niques that show that those techniques produce substantially di↵erent
assessments of confidence depending on the arbitrary choice of hazard
scope. (See Table 1 and Appendices A, B, and J.) For example, consider
a counterexample for the same technique discussed in Section 4.4.1. In
addition to the Undermined Evidence 1 case shown in Figure 2 and Ta-
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ble 2, consider a new variant of the example, Undermined Evidence 2.
The Undermined Evidence 1 and 2 examples are identical except that
the system states identified as hazards H1–H19 in the former are identi-
fied as the single hazard H1 in the latter. The systems behave identically
and we have identical evidence about their behavior. Yet the calculated
confidence in safety di↵ers dramatically: the argument is acceptable in
the former case and unacceptable in the latter. This arbitrary di↵er-
ence in hazard scope should not so dramatically change our confidence
in system safety.
In all of the examples in the selected papers in which the authors
supplied weights for an argument over hazards, the example used equal
weights. This would make sense if the mitigation of each hazard had an
equal e↵ect on system safety, but that is rarely the case. Some hazards
might lead to more dire consequences than others, and accidents are
more likely to result when in some hazardous states than in others. We
might attribute the e↵ect these counterexamples illustrate to the authors’
choice to use equal weights in their examples. Yet the papers say nothing
about choosing weights except through the examples they provide. And
following those examples leads to implausible results.
4.4.3 Technique-Specific Counterexamples
In producing counterarguments for three of the twelve selected papers, we
produced counterexamples that are unique to the techniques in question.
(See Table 1 and Appendices H, I, and L.)
Specific Counterexample 1. One of these techniques includes four
questions to be used to assess the trustworthiness of a hazard log [22]:
Q1. “If independence is required, is the person doing the verification
di↵erent than the one responsible for developing the hazard log?
Q2. “Is the manager to whom the team reports identified so that it can
be confirmed that the requirements on independence are met?
Q3. “Are there records of attendance/participation in hazard identifica-
tion workshops/exercises of the personnel that include the name,
organisation and role?
Q4. “Is there information on the competency of the personnel?”
The analyst responds to the questions using a five-point Likert scale and
uses the proposed technique to calculate confidence in the hazard log.
Our counterexample supposes (a) that two safety engineers are known, by
long history, to be hopelessly incompetent to practice, (b) that they work
independently (and that a manager has documented this) and (c) that
there is record of them attending training. The answers to questions Q1–
Q4 above might be absolutely, with very high confidence. (The engineers’
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Safety
Occurrence frequency Severity of failures
Figure 3: A BBN from [23] instantiating the definition/synthesis idiom for
safety. For consistency with other figures in this paper, we represent BBN nodes
using rectangles.
Variant Failure modes (< Frequency,Severity >) Risk
Good
⌦
10 9, 109
↵
,
⌦
10 9, 105
↵
,
⌦
10 7, 103
↵
,
⌦
10 3, 101
↵
1⇥ 101
Bad
⌦
10 9, 101
↵
,
⌦
10 9, 103
↵
,
⌦
10 7, 105
↵
,
⌦
10 3, 109
↵
1⇥ 106
Table 3: The failure modes and total risk of system variants to be modeled
using the argument in Figure 3. Risk is computed using a typical expected value
formulation, i.e. Risk =
P
i:{Failure modes} Frequencyi ⇥ Severityi.
history of incompetence is “information on the competency of the per-
sonnel” even if it shows incompetence.) Using the proposed technique,
one might conclude with very high confidence that the trustworthiness
of the hazard log that one of the incompetent engineers compiles and the
other verifies is very high. This is not plausible.
Specific Counterexample 2. The second of these techniques define
the BBN pattern shown in Figure 3 [23]. Our counterexample comprises
two variants of a system, Good and Bad, defined as shown in Table 3.
Using continuous interval nodes, we instantiate the pattern for our sys-
tems as shown in Table 4. Even though we defined Good and Bad so that
they produce maximally distinct levels of risk, the technique’s pattern
models them identically. This is not plausible.
It might be argued that we should have used a di↵erent equation
for the Safety node, that we have inappropriately combined information
about multiple failure modes into the Occurrence frequency and Severity
of failures nodes, or that the manual used the word ‘safety’ where it
meant ‘risk.’ But this counterexample survives such objections. The
problem that the counterexample reveals is the result of first reasoning
separately about the frequency and severity of system failure and then
reasoning about the resulting e↵ect on safety or risk.
Specific Counterexample 3. The third of these techniques includes a
generic BBN pattern for assessing confidence in one argument step [25].
The paper presenting this technique gives an example in which this pat-
tern is instantiated for an argument step from the premises “hazard
A, B have been eliminated” to the conclusion “system S is safe.” Our
counterexample comprises two variants of the original example, namely
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Node Distribution
Occurrence frequency [0, 10 8] , 10 6] , 10 4] , 10 2] , 1]
50% 25% 0% 25% 0%
Severity of failures [0, 102] , 104] , 106] , 108] ,1)
25% 25% 25% 0% 25%
Safety [0, 10 8] , 10 6] , 10 4] , 10 2] ,1)
0% 0% 25% 5% 70%
Table 4: The node probabilities for the BBN shown in Figure 3 and the system
variants defined in Table I1. We calculated Safety using the formula Safety =
(Occurrence frequency⇥ Severity of failures) 1. The probabilities for the Good
and Bad variants are identical.
Case Present NotPresent
From paper 89.460% 10.540%
Optimistic 89.996% 10.004%
Pessimistic 86.404% 13.596%
Table 5: Calculated value of confidence in the claim “system S is safe” for an
original example [25] and our Optimistic and Pessimistic variants.
Optimistic and Pessimistic, that represent extreme assessments of con-
fidence in the completeness of hazard identification. In both examples,
we assess all factors as in the original example except confidence in the
completeness of the hazard assessment. Where the original example uses
85% confidence in completeness, our Optimistic variant uses 99.9%, and
our Pessimistic variant uses 0.1%. Table 5 gives the resulting confidence
in system safety. It is not plausible that extreme changes in confidence in
hazard analysis would produce as small a change in confidence in safety
as the di↵erence between 90% and 86% indicates. It is also implausi-
ble that anyone who completely distrusted a hazard analysis would have
86% confidence that the analyzed system is safe.
4.4.4 Other Issues
Five other issues each a↵ect several proposals: (1) the unavailability of
trustworthy source data, (2) scalability, (3) unspecified decision proce-
dures, (4) improper treatment of GSN context, and (5) out-of-context
assessment of GSN solutions.
The Unavailability of Trustworthy Source Data. We are not the
first to note the lack of trustworthy sources of data on how well each
kind of evidence supports each kind of claim. Surveys have established
baseline figures for the reliability of components used in certain indus-
tries [45], but analogous data is not generally available for confidence in
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safety techniques. Nor are we the first to observe that trustworthy figures
for the strength of inference rules are not generally available. Many of the
selected papers call for the use of expert judgment to provide confidence
figures and weights. But none of the papers provides or cites substantial
evidence to show that the resulting figures are su ciently trustworthy.
Since poor input data could result in incorrect assessments of confidence,
trustworthy figures are a prerequisite for confidence quantification. But
no trustworthy source of the required data has been identified.
Scalability. It is not clear that all of the techniques could be applied
practicably to a full-sized argument. For example, one technique requires
the analyst to instantiate twelve BBN nodes, supply nine input probabil-
ities, and populate one conditional probability table for each reasoning
step in the assurance argument [25] (see Appendix L). Another tech-
nique requires the analyst to instantiate a confidence argument pattern
comprising at least fifty-one GSN elements once per solution in the main
argument [22, 31] (see Appendix H). Depending on the system and the
complexity of the safety concept and safety evidence, an argument might
have thousands of evidence citations and reasoning steps. It is not clear
that techniques requiring a substantial e↵ort for each will be feasible in
practice. The selected papers present no empirical evidence of scalability.
Unspecified Decision Procedures. The motivations given in several
selected papers describe using assurance arguments as part of system
certification. All describe a technique for quantifying confidence in such
assurance arguments. But few describe precisely how the quantified con-
fidence should be used to make a decision about whether the system is
su ciently safe to justify putting it into service. (Ayoub et al. mention
a comparison between the degree of belief and uncertainty in argument’s
main claim as described in Appendix A, but do not clearly state a de-
cision procedure.) Without a clearly-specified decision procedure, the
meaning of a technique’s output is unclear. For example, suppose that
a technique is intended solely to produce a confidence figure and that
the use of that figure to make decisions is left as a separate matter.
Suppose also that proponents give an example in which the technique
computes 80% confidence (or ‘high’ on a scale that includes ‘very high,’
‘certain,’ etc.). Without knowing the decision procedure, readers do not
know whether this figure represents too little confidence to justify field-
ing the system, just barely enough confidence, or abundant confidence.
And without knowing that, users of the technique don’t know how to
interpret the results and other scientists don’t know how to assess the
technique’s e cacy.
Improper Treatment of GSN Context. The Goal Structuring No-
tation includes context elements [3]. Of the twelve selected techniques,
two specify how GSN context elements a↵ect confidence [28, 29] (see
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Appendices C and E). The example of the first of these argues that “as-
surance deficits [are] acceptable” because the “argument [is] su cient”
and the “context [is] appropriate” [28]. The precise semantics of GSN
context are unclear [46]. But suppose both that inappropriate context
causes assurance deficits and that the evidence is from an entirely dif-
ferent system so that context is completely incompatible. Because the
premises are equally weighted and the conclusion is one of three premises
for the conclusion “claim [should be] accepted,” the analysis might show
that the claim should be accepted despite the argument’s irrelevance.
The other technique specifies that context asserted at a goal should
be factored into the confidence computation as if it was a premise [29].
This is inconsistent with normative guidance on GSN [46]. Moreover,
this raises the question of how analysts should evaluate confidence in
the truth of the example context statements given in the GSN standard
such as “Operating Role and Context,” “Control System Definition,”
and “SIL Guidelines and Processes” [3].
Out-of-Context Assessment of GSN Solutions. The Goal Struc-
turing Notation also includes solution elements [3]. In three of the twelve
selected techniques analysts assess confidence in GSN solution elements
out of context [18,19,32] (see Appendices A, D, and J). For example, in
one, the analyst “makes his/her assessments on the su ciency and in-
su ciency of evidence nodes” [18]. A goal supported by a single solution
then inherits the assessment of that solution. But a thing is evidence
only by virtue of having been cited in support of a claim [47]. More-
over, an item of evidence might support one claim better than another.
Opinions about the strength of evidence make sense only when applied
to evidence–claim pairs as is done in other selected techniques [22].
5 Other Potential Arguments for Quantification
In Section 4.3, we identified evidence from the selected papers that sup-
ports the hypothesis that quantified confidence is a fit basis for release-
to-service decisions. In Section 4.4, we present our argument against
that hypothesis. A proponent of quantifying confidence might respond
to this criticism by challenging the criticism or weakening the hypothesis.
In this section, we examine options for doing so.
5.1 Overlooking the Counterexamples
A proponent of quantifying confidence might claim that a given model
produces results that are generally accurate even if it produces implausi-
ble results in some ‘corner’ cases. This is plausible: a technique might be
imperfect yet su ciently accurate in an acceptably large proportion of
cases that its use should be recommended over alternatives. But showing
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this would require empirical studies of how accurately typical analysts
assess typical arguments using the proposed techniques.
One possible response to the counterexamples we present in Sec-
tion 4.4 and Appendices A–L is to declare our choices of assessments,
weights, or functions implausible. But doing so risks committing the
No True Scotsman fallacy [48]. Our counterexamples reuse assessments,
weights, and function choices from the original examples so as to ensure
the plausibility of our selections.
5.2 There Is No Alternative
A proponent might propose that the need to assess confidence justifies
using one of the available quantified confidence techniques even though
its e cacy is not firmly established. But a quantitative technique that
is no more e↵ective than qualitative techniques might be riskier: some
readers might come away with a greater impression of the trustworthi-
ness of the quantitative analysis than they would a qualitative analysis
about which equally little was known. To use quantities of unknown
quality is to risk committing the fallacy of overprecision [49]. That is,
the appearance of precision given by quantities might lead readers to put
undue trust in confidence assessments.
5.3 Quantification is Systematic
A proponent of quantifying confidence might hypothesize that because
systematic methods are more likely to give reproducible results than ad
hoc approaches, quantitative confidence analyses should be preferred to
qualitative analyses. A systematic method might yield more trustworthy
results than an unsystematic method. But even if qualitative analyses
were completely unsystematic—and they aren’t [5]—being systematic
does not guarantee producing a trustworthy result.
6 Possible Research Directions
While the proposed quantified confidence techniques are not known to
be e↵ective and might have flaws, they might nonetheless have value. To
assess this value, researchers might consider several lines of inquiry:
1. Demonstrating repeatability. If representative subjects given an ar-
gument and told to apply a given confidence assessment technique
to it do not achieve similar results, the technique is not measur-
ing confidence. (The inverse is not true: repeatable assessments
of confidence need not be accurate measures of confidence. The
technique of always reporting medium confidence is repeatable but
does not meaningfully measure confidence.)
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2. Demonstrating insensitivity to expected variance. Subjects given
details of a system and told to construct a safety argument will
construct di↵erent arguments. If applying a confidence assessment
technique to di↵erent but acceptable arguments for the same sys-
tem yields substantially di↵erent results, the technique might be
too sensitive to expected, insignificant variance to produce trust-
worthy confidence figures.
3. Demonstrating predictive power. Accidents and incidents are rare
and safety arguments are generally confidential. But if researchers
compile a substantial historical record, they could study it. If as-
sessed confidence in safety is not inversely correlated with accidents
and incidents, the technique is not measuring confidence.
7 Other Work
Following the method described in Section 3, we selected and reviewed
fifteen papers describing twelve techniques for quantifying confidence in
assurance arguments. But there are other works that discuss quantified
confidence and safety arguments.
7.1 Littlewood and Wright
Littlewood and Wright model an argument using Bayesian Belief Net-
works to explore the gain in confidence resulting from the addition of an
additional type of evidence [50]. While the paper uses a BBN to model
confidence, it does not propose this as a general technique with which
safety analysts should assess assurance arguments.
7.2 Wu and Kelly
Wu and Kelly propose a procedure for using Bayesian Belief Networks to
analyze the architecture of software for safety-critical systems [51]. They
do not propose using BBNs to analyze confidence in the safety argument.
Rather, they propose developing BBNs to analyze the probability of
certain architectural events and citing this as evidence of the correctness
of the architecture.
8 Conclusion
The burden of proving that an assurance argument confidence quantifica-
tion technique produces trustworthy assessments lies with its proposers.
But the published papers concerning such techniques do not provide or
reference strong empirical evidence for the hypothesis that typical safety
analysts using the technique will produce confidence assessments that
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are su ciently trustworthy to serve as a basis for the decision to accept
or reject a critical system based on its assurance argument.
Nonetheless, we investigated the proposed techniques we were aware
of. For each technique, we attempted to replicate the authors’ examples
and derive counterexamples that produce implausible results. We found
a counterexample for each technique for which there was a compelling
worked example we could reproduce.
We do not claim that our results show that the probability theories
underlying the proposed techniques are in error. However, the proposed
uses of those theories—the techniques we review—are, at best, imperfect.
Without research that provides strong, direct evidence that the resulting
confidence assessments are trustworthy, there is no plausible justification
for relying on one of these techniques in making decisions about which
critical systems to deploy or continue to operate.
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Appendix A
Ayoub, Chang, Sokolsky, and Lee
Ayoub, Chang, Sokolsky, and Lee propose to compute the su ciency of
safety arguments using Dempster–Shafer theory [18].
A.1 Proposed Technique
In the proposed technique, the analyst uses an existing confidence argu-
ment and a procedure not specified in the paper “to make his/her as-
sessments on the su ciency and insu ciency of the evidence nodes” [18].
The analyst then uses aggregation rules to assess claims, working from
evidence toward the main safety claim. While the paper describes this
process as “automatic,” the analyst must make judgements about evi-
dence, select aggregation rules, and provide weights and scaling factors.
Illustrative Example. The paper illustrates the technique with the
example depicted in Figure A1 and presents calculations for several sit-
uations, including one where “the expert opinion is that the justification
J1 covers only 80% of the cases.” Table A1 gives the evidence su ciency
figures from the paper.
Claim Supported by a Single Piece of Evidence. When a claim
is supported by exactly one piece of evidence, such as G2 in Figure A1,
it is assessed the same as its supporting evidence.
Claim Supported by an Alternative Argument. The paper refers
to arguments such as that supporting G3 in Figure A1 “where more
than one independent support of the common conclusion is provided”
as alternative arguments [18]. Analysts calculate the su ciency (mc(S))
and insu ciency (mc(I)) of the such arguments from premises a and b
using the following formulae:
mc=a b(S) =
ma(S)mb(S) +ma(S)mb(U) +ma(U)mb(S)
1  (ma(S) ⇤mb(I) +ma(I)mb(S)) (A1)
mc=a b(I) =
ma(I)mb(I) +ma(I)mb(U) +ma(U)mb(I)
1  (ma(S) ⇤mb(I) +ma(I)mb(S)) (A2)
The uncertainty is the remaining mass:
mc(U) = 1  (mc(S) +mc(I)) (A3)
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G3. Probability of H2 
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Fromal [sic] 
verification 
results
Ev3.
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results
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Fault tree 
analysis
J1. 1*10-6 [sic] limit for 
catastrophic hazards
J
Figure A1: An example safety argument rendered in the Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN) [3] and taken from [18].
Evidence Su cient Insu cient Uncertainty
Ev1 0.800 0.100 0.100
Ev2 0.700 0.100 0.200
Ev3 0.500 0.200 0.300
G1 0.807 0.106 0.087
G2 0.800 0.100 0.100
G3 0.815 0.111 0.074
S1 0.807 0.106 0.087
Table A1: Su ciency of Figure A1’s nodes, taken from [18].
Claim Supported by a Disjoint Argument. The paper refers to
arguments such as that supporting S1 in Figure A1 “where the sup-
porting nodes provide complementary support for the conclusion” as
disjoint arguments [18]. Analysts calculate the su ciency (mc(S)) and
insu ciency (mc(I)) of such arguments from premises 1 . . . n using the
following formulae:
mc(S) =
Pn
i=1wi ⇤mi(S)Pn
i=1wi
(A4)
mc(I) =
Pn
i=1wi ⇤mi(I)Pn
i=1wi
(A5)
The paper does not specify how to obtain the weights w1 . . . wn generally
but uses equal weights in the argument supporting S1.
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Test for Argument Su ciency. While the paper does not explicitly
define a test for argument acceptance, the authors reject an alternative
version of the argument in Figure A1 because its “degree of uncertainty
is very high relative to the degree of belief of the argument su ciency.”
A.2 Replication
We replicated the base case of the paper’s example. H1 and H2 are the
only identified hazards and the su ciency and insu ciency of G1 are the
same as that of S1. Using Equations A1–A5 and the assessments of Ev1,
Ev2, and Ev3 given in Table A1, we calculated the assessments of G1–G3
and S1 shown in Table A1. Our results do not match the authors’ figures.
The authors appear to have used a variant of the G3 assessment (labeled
as Case 3 of G2 in the paper) as input to the base-case assessment of S1
and G1. In any case, since G1’s su ciency (0.807) is much higher than
its uncertainty (0.087), this argument is acceptable per the technique.
A.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
The paper does not present an empirical evaluation of the e cacy of the
proposed technique [18]. Nevertheless, the authors’ “preliminary expe-
rience of applying the proposed method has revealed that the assessing
mechanism yields the expected benefits in guiding the safety argument
reviewer and helping him/her to reduce the e↵ect of the confirmation
bias mindset.” The paper speculates that the latter e↵ect will result
from asking the analyst’s opinion on both su ciency and insu ciency.
A.4 Counterargument
To show that confidence computed using the proposed technique is not an
appropriate basis for making release to service decisions in all cases, we
use four variants of the example presented in the paper: Many Hazards,
Undermined Evidence 1, Undermined Evidence 2, and Counterevidence.
The examples collectively illustrate two problems with the proposed tech-
nique: (1) that it allows evidence of the mitigation of one hazard to hide
a lack of evidence of the mitigation of another or even evidence showing
that another is inadequately mitigated, and (2) that it gives di↵erent
results depending on arbitrary choices about hazard scope.
Many Hazards Example. While some systems might have only two
hazards, other systems will have dozens. In our Many Hazards variant
of the paper’s example, the system addresses twenty-one hazards. We
assume that the first twenty of these have been eliminated in design
like H1 and so replace G2 and Ev1 in Figure A1 with G2.1–G2.20 and
Ev1.1–Ev1.20, respectively. Figure A2 shows the resulting argument.
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Figure A2: Our Many Hazards (with G2.2–G2.19 and Ev1.2–Ev.19 but not
Ev4), Undermined Evidence 1 (with G2.2–G2.19 and Ev1.2–Ev.19 but not Ev4),
Undermined Evidence 2 (without G2.2–G2.19, Ev1.2–Ev.19 or Ev4) and Counter
Evidence (with G2.2–G2.19, Ev1.2–Ev.19, and Ev4) variants of the example
safety argument shown in Figure A1.
Undermined Evidence 1 and 2 Examples. Suppose that the evi-
dence regarding hazard H20 is insu cient: the premises to be verified
were entered incorrectly into the theorem prover, so the proof does not
show what it was meant to show. Our Undermined Evidence 1 exam-
ple is identical to Many Hazards except that mEv1.20(S) = 0.050 and
mEv1.20(I) = 0.900. Our Undermined Evidence 2 example is identical to
Many Hazards except that it lacks hazards H2–H19 because the defini-
tion of hazard H1 has been expanded to include these.
Counterevidence Example. It is possible that operational history
will confirm or deny safety claims. Our Counterevidence example is
identical to Many Hazards except that goal G3 is additionally supported
by a solution Ev4 citing operational history. The su ciency of G3 is
given by:
mG3(S) = (mEv2(S) mEv3(S)) mEv4(S) (A6)
Similarly, the insu ciency of G3 is given by repeated applications of
Equation A2. We suppose that history shows that hazard H21 has been
occurring at a rate far exceeding the limit specified in G3 and J1 and
thus that mEv4(S) = 0.050 and mEv4(I) = 0.900.
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Element(s) Variant Su↵. Insu↵. Uncert.
Ev1.1 All 0.800 0.100 0.100
Ev1.2–19 All but Undermined 0.800 0.100 0.100
Evidence 2
Ev1.20 Many Hazards, 0.800 0.100 0.100
Counterevidence
Undermined Evidence 0.050 0.900 0.050
1 and 2
Ev2 All 0.700 0.100 0.200
Ev3 All 0.500 0.200 0.300
Ev4 Counterevidence 0.050 0.900 0.050
G3 All but Counterevidence 0.815 0.111 0.074
Counterevidence 0.326 0.660 0.014
S1, G1 Many Hazards 0.801 0.101 0.099
Undermined Evidence 1 0.765 0.139 0.096
Undermined Evidence 2 0.079 0.053 0.868
Counterevidence 0.777 0.127 0.096
Table A2: The su ciency, insu ciency, and uncertainty of the evidence,
Hazard H21 mitigation claim, and main safety claim in the example arguments
shown in Figure A2.
Analysis of examples. Table A2 gives the calculated assessment of
G1 for all four variants. It is not implausible that mG1(S) is 0.801 in the
Many Hazards example. But the proposed technique computes similar
values of mG1(S) for the Undermined Evidence 1 and Counterevidence
variants. Because an uncertainty of 0.096–0.099 is not very high relative
to a su ciency of 0.765–0.801, the proposed technique shows these three
example arguments to be acceptable. But it is not plausible that the
system is acceptable either despite a lack of substantial evidence that
one of its hazards is mitigated or in the presence of evidence that one is
not mitigated. These examples show that it might be dangerous to base
release-to-service decisions solely on the calculated argument su ciency:
an analyst who did so might decide that the lack of evidence or presence
of counter evidence does not indicate a problem that must be addressed.
The Undermined Evidence 1 and 2 examples demonstrate that cal-
culated confidence is highly sensitive to arbitrary decisions about hazard
scope. In both of these examples, the same dangerous system states are
mitigated in the same way. The only di↵erence between them is that
the state that is defined as hazards H1–H19 in Undermined Evidence 1
is defined as the single hazard H1 in Undermined Evidence 2. While the
technique assesses the safety argument to be acceptable in the former
case, it finds the safety argument unacceptable in the latter. It is not
plausible than an arbitrary di↵erence in hazard scope should change our
confidence in system safety.
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Note. It might have been more appropriate to represent undermined ev-
idence of the mitigation of hazard H20 asmEv1.20(S) = 0.050, mEv1.20(I)
= 0.050, and mEv1.20(U) = 0.900 rather than 0.050, 0.900, and 0.050,
respectively. Had we done so, mG1(S) = 0.765, mG1(I) = 0.098, and
mG1(U) = 0.137 in the Undermined Evidence 1 case and 0.079, 0.012,
and 0.908, respectively, in the Undermined Evidence 2 case. Our choice
to represent undermined evidence as insu ciency rather than uncer-
tainty does not substantially a↵ect our counterexamples.
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Appendix B
Cyra and Go´rski
Cyra and Go´rski propose to evaluate confidence in assurance cases (which
they call trust cases) using Dempster–Shafer theory [26,27].
B.1 Proposed Technique
In the proposed technique, assurance arguments are composed of claims
supported by arguments. Each argument has premises and, in some
cases, a warrant. Each premise might be another claim (supported by
further argument), a fact (associated with a reference to the evidence),
or an assumption. The analyst rates each assumption, fact, and warrant
using Jøsang’s opinion triangle [27, 41]. On one axis of the triangle,
decisions are rated on the scale:
Acceptable Dec(s) = 3/3
Tolerable Dec(s) = 2/3
Opposable Dec(s) = 1/3
Rejectable Dec(s) = 0/3
On the other axis, confidence in those decisions is rated on the scale:
For sure Conf (s) = 5/5
With very high confidence Conf (s) = 4/5
With high confidence Conf (s) = 3/5
With low confidence Conf (s) = 2/5
With very low confidence Conf (s) = 1/5
Lack of confidence Conf (s) = 0/5
The analyst converts these assessments into Dempster–Shafer belief and
plausibility values and computes confidence in the conclusion of each rea-
soning step by applying one of four di↵erent sets of formulae depending
on the type of argument [27].
Complementary Arguments. The paper defines arguments in which
“each of the premises ‘covers’ part of the conclusion” as complementary
arguments (C-args) [27]. The analyst assessing a complementary argu-
ment converts his or her assessment of the warrant and premises into
belief Bel(s) and plausibility Pl(s) values using
Bel(s) = Conf 0(s) ·Dec0(s) (B1)
and
Pl(s) = 1  Conf 0(s) ·  1 Dec0(s)  (B2)
where ⌦
Conf 0(s),Dec0(s)
↵
= sC (hConf (s),Dec(s)i) (B3)
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and sC : [0, 1] ⇥ [0, 1] ! [0, 1] ⇥ [0, 1] is a scaling function for use in
complementary arguments. The paper provides a graphic representation
of the e↵ect of sC on confidence but not on the decision. The analyst
then combines the converted values of the premises a1 . . . an and warrant
w using
Bel(c) = Bel(w) ·
Pn
i=1 kiBel (ai)Pn
i=1 ki
(B4)
and
Pl(c) = 1  Bel(w) ·
✓
1 
Pn
i=1 kiPl(ai)Pn
i=1 ki
◆
(B5)
The paper does not specify how to obtain the weights ki. The analyst
then converts the combined values back into decision and confidence
figures using
Dec0 (c) =
(
Bel(c)
Bel(c)+1 Pl(c) Bel (c) + 1  Pl (c) 6= 0
1 Bel (c) + 1  Pl (c) = 0 (B6)
Conf 0 (c) = Bel (c) + 1  Pl (c) (B7)
and
hConf (c),Dec(c)i = s 1C
 ⌦
Conf 0(c),Dec0(c)
↵ 
(B8)
Necessary and Su cient Condition List Arguments. An analyst
assessing a necessary and su cient condition list argument (NSC-arg)
converts decision and confidence assessments into belief and plausibility
using Equations B1 and B2 and an equation similar to Equation B3
except using a di↵erent, unspecified scaling function sNSC . The analyst
then combines the belief and plausibility figures for the premises a1 . . . an
and warrant w using
Bel(c) = Bel(w) ·
nY
i=1
Bel(ai) (B9)
and
Pl(c) = 1  Bel(w) ·
 
1 
nY
i=1
Pl(ai)
!
(B10)
Again, the combined belief and plausibility values can be converted back
to decision and confidence figures using Equations B6 and B7 and an
equation similar similar to Equation B8 using the scaling function sNSC .
Conversion to Assessment Scales. Analysts and tools convert com-
puted decision and confidence values into their linguistic equivalents by
choosing the nearest linguistic value.
Test for Argument Su ciency. The paper does not specify how to
use computed results to determine whether a system is su ciently safe
or secure to be put into service.
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CL CO: Validity of information supplied to PIPS
Arg A0: Argument by considering possible channels
W0: Analysis of different channelsW
CL C1: Validity of information from PIPS-enabled devices
CL C2: Validity of information from questionnaire
CL C3: Validity of product codes
As A1: Truthfulness of the information provided by a patient
(with high confidence acceptable)
(6, with very high confidence acceptable)
(with high confidence tolerable)
(4, with high confidence acceptable)
(4, with high confidence acceptable)
(6, for sure acceptable)
Figure B1: An example trust argument taken from [27]. PIPS stands for the
name of the example system.
Illustrative Example. The papers give several examples about the
Personalised Information Platform for Health and Life Services (PIPS)
system argument to illustrate the proposed technique [27]. Figure B1
depicts the paper’s argument for that system.
B.2 Replication
Since the papers do not provide the scaling functions, we were unable
to replicate the calculations in the paper’s example by hand. However,
the scaling functions are built into the latest version of the authors’ tool,
now called Nor-Sta [8]. The authors graciously granted us access to their
tool, and with it we were able to replicate their calculations.
B.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
The objectives for the proposed technique are “(1) assessment of the
compelling power of an argument and (2) communication of the result of
such an assessment to relevant recipients” [27]. To assess the technique,
the authors performed an “experimental calibration and validation of
the aggregation mechanism.”
Experimental Method. The paper reports,
All scaling functions were calculated using the data obtained
in the experiment. 31 students studying for the Master’s de-
gree in information technologies (the last year) were selected
for the experiment. The participants had a good background
in logic and mathematics and they also attended a two-hour
lecture about trust cases.
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The participants were divided into three groups. Each
group was supposed to apply one of the aggregation rules:
A-rule, C-rule or NSC-rule . . . .
Each participant was provided with five simple trust cases
composed of a claim, an argument strategy, a warrant and
premises (in the case of C-rule and NSC-rule) or a claim with
a few argument strategies (in the case of A-rule). . . .
The experiment participants were asked to assess the war-
rant and, in the case of C-rule to assign weights to the
premises. Then, assuming the pre-defined assessments of
each premise (in the case of C-rule and NSC-rule) or the
assessments assigned to each of the argument strategies (in
the case of A-rule) the participants were asked to give their
assessment of the conclusion using the Assessment Triangle.
From the resulting data, the authors derived the four scaling functions
and assessed both
Consistency of assessments, measured by calculating the root-
mean-square value of the di↵erence between the first and re-
peated assessment (by the same participant) of the same con-
clusion with the same assessments assigned to the premises
and
Accuracy of assessments, measured by calculating the root-
mean-square value of the di↵erence between a participant’s
assessment and the result of application of the aggregation
rule.
Experimental Results. The experimental results show that individ-
ual students assess arguments somewhat inconsistently: the root-mean-
squared value of consistency ranged between 0.62 of a linguistic scale
category in the case of C-rule decisions and 1.03 of a category in the
case of A-rule confidence. Individual assessments varied from what ap-
plication of the proposed technique would predict by about as much: the
root-mean-squared value of accuracy ranged between 0.66 of a category
in the case of NSC-rule decisions and 1.10 of a category in the case of
C-rule confidence.
Our Analysis. The authors present one of only two only empirical
assessments of the e cacy of a quantified confidence technique we are
aware of. But there are threats to the validity of the experiment that
limit its value as evidence of the technique’s e cacy. Two stand out:
(1) the problem of using the same data to define and assess a technique,
and (2) the representativeness of a small student sample.
The danger in using the same data to both define and assess a tech-
nique is that the technique might be e↵ective only for the specimen
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CL CO: The system is acceptably safe to operate
Arg A0: Argument over hazard identification and mitigation
W0: If all significant hazards are identified and adequately 
mitigated, the system is acceptably safe to operate
W
CL C1: All significant hazards are identified
CL C2: All identified hazards are adequately mitigated
…
Arg A1: Argument over all identified hazards
W0: All identified hazards are adequately mitigated 
iff each of hazards H1–H20 is adequately mitigated
W
CL C3: Hazard H1 is adequately mitigated
CL C22: Hazard H20 is adequately mitigated
…
…
…
Figure B2: A typical top-level safety argument in the style of the proposed
technique [26,27].
problem from which it was derived. This problem can be addressed by
using an approach such as n-fold cross validation. But the paper does
not mention whether or how the authors addressed this problem.
It is not clear that the reasoning a small number of students used to
assess a small number of simple example arguments can be taken as the
norm for reasoning about confidence in all assurance cases. Students and
seasoned security professionals might assess arguments di↵erently. The
five selected arguments of each type might not be representative of all
arguments. And it is possible that people generally assess the specimen
arguments incorrectly.
B.4 Counterargument
Since our expertise is in safety, not security, we use a safety argument
to assess the proposed technique. Figure B2 depicts a typical top-level
safety argument. A0 is a su cient condition list argument (SC-arg) and
A1 is a necessary and su cient condition list argument (NSC-arg). Ta-
ble B1 shows assessments for five variants of the argument in Figure B2,
which we identify as Optimistic, Counterevidence, Unsupported, Imper-
fect A and Imperfect B. In all five variants, we are sure about the warrants
for both arguments and have very high confidence in the completeness
of hazard identification. We use the five examples to demonstrate two
implausible features of the proposed technique: (1) it amplifies small
doubts about each hazard’s mitigation into large doubt about system
safety, and (2) it produces similar confidence estimates for systems that
should be regarded di↵erently by stakeholders.
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Node Opt. Cntrev. Unsupp. Impf. A Impf. B
W0 5/5, 3/3
W1 5/5, 3/3
C1 4/5, 3/3
C3 4/5, 3/3 4/5, 1/3 1/5, 3/3 4/5, 3/3
C4–C7 5/5, 3/3 5/5, 3/3
C8–C19 5/5, 3/3 4/5, 3/3 3/5, 3/3
C20–C22 5/5, 3/3 3/5, 3/3
C2 4/5, 3/3 4/5, 1/3 1/5, 3/3 2/5, 3/3 1/5, 3/3
C0 4/5, 3/3 0/5, — 1/5, 3/3 1/5, 3/3 0/5, —
Table B1: Assessments of the confidence and decision (Conf (s), Res(c)) for
the Optimistic (Opt.), Counterevidence (Cntrev.), Unsupported (Unsupp.), Im-
perfect A (Impf. A), and Imperfect B (Impf. B) variants of the argument shown
in Figure B2.
Optimistic Example. In the Optimistic variant, we have very high
confidence that hazard H1 is adequately mitigated and are sure that
all other hazards are adequately mitigated. This is unrealistic: typical
safety evidence does not entail adequate management of a hazard. But
the result is that the safety claim is with very high confidence acceptable.
Counterevidence Example. In the Counterevidence variant, we are
completely sure about the mitigation of all hazards except H1: we assess
the claim that H1 is mitigated as with very high confidence opposable.
That is, we have counterevidence against the claim that H1 is adequately
managed. The result is a complete lack of confidence in the safety claim.
Unsupported Example. In the Unsupported variant, we are also com-
pletely sure about the mitigation of all hazards accept H1. In this exam-
ple, we find the claim that H1 is adequately mitigated to be with very
low confidence acceptable. That is, the claim that H1 is (nearly) unsup-
ported. The result is that the safety claim is with very low confidence
acceptable.
Imperfect A and B Examples. In the Realist A and Realist B vari-
ants, we are completely sure that some hazards are adequately mitigated
(four in each case), have very high confidence that others are adequately
mitigated (thirteen in Realist A and one in Realist B), and have only
high confidence that the remaining hazards are adequately mitigated
(three in Realist A and fifteen in Realist B). Since the Nor-Sta tool does
not give Conf (c) and Res(c) numerically, we use two Realist variants to
illustrate the di↵erence needed to push an assessment from one linguis-
tic category to the next. In any case, the result is that either the safety
claim is with very low confidence acceptable (Realist A) or complete lack
of confidence in the safety claim (Realist B).
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Analysis of Examples. These examples demonstrate two implausible
features of the proposed technique. First, the technique amplifies small
doubts about how well each hazard has been mitigated into large doubt
about the safety of the system. The Realist A case illustrates this e↵ect:
if we have high confidence or better in the mitigation of twenty hazards—
very high confidence or certainty in the mitigation of all but three—
we still have very low confidence in system safety. This e↵ect is the
result of multiplying together the assessor’s beliefs in the adequacy of the
mitigation of each hazard as specified by Equation B9 and will worsen
as the number of hazards increases.
Second, the technique produces similar confidence estimations for
(i) systems for which we have realistic doubts, such as the Imperfect A
and B variants; (ii) systems for which we have little evidence about the
mitigation of one hazard, such as the Unsupported variant; and (iii) sys-
tems in which we have reasonable evidence to show that one hazard isn’t
adequately mitigated, such as the Counterevidence variant. It is not
plausible that confidence in our Imperfect A, Imperfect B, Counterevi-
dence, and Undermined variants should be similar, as this means that
any test of confidence su ciency that would cause us to reject the latter
two arguments would also cause us to reject the former two.
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Appendix C
Denney, Pai, and Habli
Denney, Pai, and Habli propose to compute uncertainty in safety claims
by constructing Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) that roughly mirror
the structure of a safety argument [28].
C.1 Proposed Technique
Experts enumerate each source of uncertainty in the argument and create
a BBN node representing the absence of each on the following scale:
Very Low 0–20% probability
Low 20–40% probability
Medium 40–60% probability
High 60–80% probability
Very High 80–100% probability
Experts provide the value for each leaf node “from both quantitative
data . . . and from qualitative means.” They use a truncated “normal
distribution whose mean is the prior belief (or measure) of confidence and
the variance is picked so as to appropriately represent the confidence in
this prior itself.” The authors note that “when only subjective judgment
is available, quantifying confidence and selecting an appropriate prior
distribution is problematic” but “believe that one way to address this
issue is to identify metrics using techniques such as the Goal-Question-
Metric” method [52].
For non-leaf nodes, the technique requires the analyst to “specify a
prior conditional probability distribution . . . in a parametric way, again
using a truncated Normal distribution. Here, the mean of the distribu-
tion is the weighted average of the parent [random variable] while the
variance is the inverse of the sum of the weights [53].”
Illustrative Example. Figure C1 shows the structure of the BBN with
which the paper illustrates the technique.
Test for Argument Su ciency. The paper states that part of the
purpose of assessing confidence in an argument is to gauge whether its
main claim should be accepted but does not specify a test for whether a
given computed probability justifies putting a system into service.
C.2 Replication
The paper depicts the example BBN’s structure and gives a histogram
for each node but not the means and variances of leaf nodes or the
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Claim AcceptedLow PFD of Pitot Probe
Specification Correct Computation Correct Assurance Deficits
Acceptable
Accurate 
Calibration
Correct 
Formula
Proof 
Correct
Argument 
Sufficient
Context 
Appropriate
Figure C1: An example BBN for part of a safety argument, taken from [28].
For compactness and consistency with other BBNs in this paper, we represent
nodes as rectangles. ‘PFD’ stands for probability of failure on demand.
Node Value
Accurate Calibration Mean=0.95, Variance=0.05
Correct Formula Mean=0.85, Variance=0.01
Proof Correct Mean=0.90, Variance=0.01
Argument Su cient Mean=0.50, Variance=0.05
Context Appropriate Mean=0.50, Variance=0.05
Low PFD of Pitot Probe Mean=0.85, Variance=0.05
Specification Correct Accurate Calibration and Correct
Formula both weighted 100
Computation Correct Specification Correct and Proof
Correct both weighted 100
Assurance Deficits Acceptable Argument Su cient and Context
Appropriate both weighted 100
Claim Accepted Low PFD of Pitot Probe and
Assurance Deficits Acceptable
weighted 100, Computation Correct
weighted 200
Table C1: Parameters for normal distributions of nodes shown in Figure C1.
weights for non-leaf nodes. By trial and error, we arrived at parameters
which approximate the example in the paper. We used ranked nodes
to replicate the structure shown in Figure C1. For leaf nodes, we used
the truncated normal distribution and the mean and variance values
given in Table C1. For non-leaf nodes, we used the weights shown in
Table C1 and our tool’s weighted mean function with the variance  2 =
(
P
w:weightsw)
 1. Table C2 gives the resulting distributions. The paper
gives the distribution to thousandths of a percent, and our calculated
values agree exactly. Our non-leaf nodes di↵er from those in the paper
by as much as 0.9%, indicating that our weights di↵er slightly.
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Table C2: Calculated distributions of the nodes shown in Figure C1. We
include both the figures from our reverse engineering (R.E.) and the original
figures from the paper (F.P.)
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Recreated Original Observed Failures
Very Low — —
Low — 5.3%
Medium 12.5% 59.8%
High 64.0% 34.5%
Very High 23.3% —
Table C3: Confidence in Figure C1’s Claim Accepted.
C.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
The authors motivate their work, in part, by noting that “subjectivity
inherent in the structure of the argument and its supporting evidence
. . . pose[s] a key challenge to the measurement and quantification of
confidence in the overall safety case.” However, since the proposed tech-
nique derives the BBN’s structure from that of the assurance argument,
it could not possibly address this concern.
The paper hypothesizes that “where data for quantitative measure-
ments can be systematically collected, quantitative arguments provide
benefits over qualitative arguments in assessing confidence in the safety
case.” But data might be collected systematically (i.e., according to a
defined procedure) and yet be inaccurate. The paper neither provides
nor cites empirical evidence that assessors using figures from a given
source produce more accurate assessments of argument confidence than
qualitative assessments would provide.
The paper concludes that “linking qualitative safety arguments to
quantitative arguments about uncertainty and confidence . . . ensur[es]
rigor in measuring confidence via probabilistic reasoning using [BBNs].”
While the reader might infer that a rigorous measure of confidence pro-
vides a trustworthy result, the paper neither presents nor cites substan-
tial empirical evidence for this hypothesis.
C.4 Counterargument
We created a Observed Failures variant of our recreation of the original
example given in the paper. The premise of the variant is that the pitot
tube is observed to fail more often than the limit represented by ‘low’
probability of failure on demand. We represent this by setting the the
mean of Low PFD of Pitot Tube to 0 and its variance to 0.0001. Table C3
gives the results. While the correct functioning of the pitot tube is
critical in this system, the result of the observed failures is to turn High
confidence in the safety claim into Medium confidence. The paper does
not defineMedium confidence in terms of the e↵ect it should on a decision
to release a system into service or allow it to continue operation. But
our understanding of ‘medium confidence’ is incompatible with a system
that depends on a critical part that is known to fail too often.
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The figures in Table C3 might be slightly di↵erent had we used
slightly di↵erent weights. But the problem illustrated by the Observed
Failures would remain. That is because confidence in the main safety
claim is defined as the weighted mean of confidence in the reliability of
the pitot tube and the correctness of the software and argument.
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Appendix D
Duan, Rayadurgam, Heimdahl, Sokolsky, and
Lee
Duan, Rayadurgam, Heimdahl, Sokolsky, and Lee propose using the beta
distribution and Jøsang’s opinion triangle to model uncertainty in assur-
ance case evidence [19].
D.1 Proposed Technique
The proposed technique assumes the existence of a safety argument.
Analysts express their opinion about “evidence nodes” in this argument
in terms of degree of belief (b), disbelief (d), and uncertainty (u). Belief,
disbelief, and uncertainty in claims depending on that evidence is then
calculated using the beta distribution. For example, the authors relate
Jøsang’s consensus operator for opinions ⇡A = bA, dA, uA and ⇡B =
bB, dB, uB in cases where uA + uB   uAuB 6= 0 [54]:
bA,B =
bAuB + bBuA
uA + uB   uAuB (D1)
dA,B =
dAuB + dBuA
uA + uB   uAuB (D2)
uA,B =
uAuB
uA + uB   uAuB (D3)
Illustrative Example. The paper provides an illustrative example of a
partial assurance argument for an airport backscatter x-ray machine [19].
Figure D1 depicts this argument. Table D1 gives the example opinions
about the evidence cited by the argument. The example models the
joint support of Sn1 and Sn2 for G2 and of Sn3 and Sn4 for G3 using
the consensus operator. It models the joint support of G2 and G3 for G1
using an unspecified logical or operator. The calculated values are then
mapped onto opinions using Jøsang’s opinion triangle [42].
Test for Argument Su ciency. The paper does not specify how to
use calculated opinions to make a decision about whether an assurance
argument justifies putting a system into service.
D.2 Replication
The paper does not specify how to convert between opinions and beta
distributions save that this should be done “based on Jøsang’s work” [19].
Jøsang’s recent work (e.g., [42,55]) uses the following equations, in which
a represents atomicity :
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Sn1: 
Formal 
verification 
results
G1: All causes of overradiation 
have been eliminated
S1: Argument over all identified causes
C1. Identified all causes 
of overradiation
G2: Software operating as intended G3: Timer interlock operating correctly
Sn2: 
Testing 
results
Sn3:
Fault Tree 
Analysis
Sn4:
Testing 
results
Figure D1: An example GSN assurance argument about an airport x-ray ma-
chine taken from [19].
Element Opinion values Beta parameters
Sn1 ⇡(0.70, 0.20, 0.10) ↵ = 8.00   = 2.00
Sn2 ⇡(0.50, 0.20, 0.30) ↵ = 2.67   = 1.67
Sn3 ⇡(0.30, 0.50, 0.20) ↵ = 2.50   = 3.50
Sn4 ⇡(0.90, 0.05, 0.05) ↵ = 19.00   = 2.00
G1 Not given ↵ = 40.29   = 2.38
G2 Not given ↵ = 9.75   = 3.75
G3 Not given ↵ = 21.25   = 4.75
Table D1: Opinions about elements shown in Figure D1, taken from [19].
Opinions are given as ⇡(b, d, u) where b represents the degree of belief, d the
degree of disbelief, and u the uncertainty, all on the scale [0, 1].
↵ = r + 2a (D4)
  = s+ 2 (1  a) (D5)
r = 2bx/ux (D6)
s = 2dx/ux (D7)
1 = bx + dx + ux (D8)
Combining Equations D4–D8 yields:
↵ =
✓
2bx
ux
◆
+ 2a (D9)
  =
✓
2dx
ux
◆
+ 2 (1  a) (D10)
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But these equations are not compatible with the opinions and beta pa-
rameters shown in Table D1. For example, applying Equations D9 and
D10 yield ↵Sn1 = 15.0 and  Sn1 = 5.00. Personal communication with
the authors revealed that the paper uses an earlier version of Jøsang’s
equations [54, 56]:
↵ = r + 1 (D11)
  = s+ 1 (D12)
rp = bp/ip (D13)
sp = dp/ip (D14)
1 = b+ d+ i (D15)
In this earlier model—and in contrast with the paper—Jøsang uses i
(ignorance) in place of u (uncertainty) and omits a (atomicity) entirely.
The authors use the earlier versions of these equations because these were
the first versions they encountered rather than to obtain some perceived
benefit [56]. In any case, combining Equations D11–D15 yields
↵ =
b
i
+ 1 (D16)
  =
d
i
+ 1 (D17)
Using these equations, we arrive at the beta distributions shown in Ta-
ble D1, save for  Sn1, which the authors agree should be 3.0, not 2.0 [56].
While the authors do not present a logical-or operator, Jøsang defines
such an operator as [42]
bx_y = bx + by   bxby (D18)
dx_y = dxdy (D19)
ux_y = dxuy + uxdy + uxuy (D20)
Using Equations D1–D3 and D11–D20, substituting in the erroneous
value of  Sn1, and rounding the figures after calculating each conclusion
as the authors did [56], we duplicated the results shown in Table D1.
D.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
The paper hypothesizes that “the use of a distribution to represent confi-
dence in assurance cases makes intuitive sense and . . . the beta distribu-
tion is the most appropriate one to use” [19]. It supports this hypothesis
by arguing that the beta distribution is “more versatile” and “allows for
a better representation of human opinion” than competing distributions
such as the doubly-truncated normal distribution used in some BBN
tools. This is because “there are a couple of shapes that the truncated
normal cannot approximate, such as a curve where the mean and mode
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are not equal (a skewed Gaussian), a true uniform distribution, or a true
power distribution.” The paper presents no evidence that it is necessary
to approximate those distributions to produce a trustworthy figure for
confidence in any assurance argument that might arise in practice.
The paper concludes that the proposed “novel use of subjective logic
and the beta distribution to represent confidence will be of great benefit
to assurance case evaluation and review.” This is because the proposed
technique o↵ers “a more intuitive way to capture the confidence and
uncertainty associated with evidence and compute the confidence and
uncertainty associated with claims relying on that evidence” than con-
fidence arguments [7], BBN-based approaches [28, 53], and Dempster–
Shafer theory [18]. The paper o↵ers no evidence that the result is intu-
itive to the intended safety case readership. More importantly, it o↵ers
no evidence to support the implied claim that the proposed technique is
a way to (correctly) assess confidence and uncertainty in safety claims.
D.4 Counterargument
The proposed technique obscures the impact of conflicting evidence and
incorrectly ascribes confidence to items of evidence. Moreover, the orig-
inal example fails to account for confidence in an important property of
evidence because the argument asserts that property as context.
D.4.1 Conflicting Evidence
One obvious question to ask is what the proposed technique makes of
disconfirming evidence. Here, we focus on the software leg of Figure D1,
i.e. G2, Sn1, and Sn2. Table D1 gives the opinions about Sn1 and Sn2
from the paper, which are repeated in Table D2. From these, we calcu-
late the belief, disbelief, and uncertainty in G2 using Equations D1–D3.
Table D2 shows the results. To demonstrate the consensus operator’s
e↵ect on disconfirming evidence, we define the Conflict and More Evi-
dence variants of the paper’s original example. We use these examples
to show how confirming evidence overwhelms disconfirming evidence in
cases where it should not.
Conflict Example. In the Conflict example, we posit complete source-
code-to-specification refinement proofs and a qualified complier. This is
stronger than the static analysis used in the original example, but the
proof tools might still have undiscovered defects or be configured or used
improperly. We further suppose that a unit test run in a simulated envi-
ronment fails, resulting in strong but imperfect disconfirming evidence.
As shown in Table D2, we assign 95% belief to the static analysis evi-
dence and 95% disbelief to the testing evidence. The result is an even
49%–49% balance of belief and disbelief in the software correctness claim
(G2) and 90% belief in the correctness of the system safety claim (G1).
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Node Original version Conflict More Evidence
b d u b d u b d u
Ev1 0.70 0.20 0.10 0.95 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00 0.05
Ev2 0.50 0.20 0.30 0.00 0.95 0.05 0.00 0.95 0.05
Ev5 Not applicable 0.60 0.00 0.40
G2 0.70 0.22 0.08 0.49 0.49 0.03 0.51 0.47 0.02
G1 0.94 0.03 0.02 0.90 0.07 0.03 0.91 0.07 0.02
Table D2: Computed confidence in a software claim for three variants of the
argument shown in Figure D1: the authors’ original and our Conflict and More
Evidence variants.
More Evidence Example. In the More Evidence example, we add
a third piece of evidence, namely source code inspections. This third
piece of evidence is much weaker—60% belief, 40% uncertainty—but
reveals no problem with the source code. Table D2 shows the results.
In the More Evidence alternative, the weak third item of evidence tips
the balance in favor of the software behavior claim: 51% belief in the
software correctness claim and 91% belief in the system safety claim.
Analysis of Examples. It is possible (and perhaps likely) that the
symptoms illustrated by the Conflict and More Evidence scenarios reflect
a problem that could be revealed by testing but not by static analysis or
source code inspection. For example, a compiler option might have been
set incorrectly, resulting in an executable binary that is unsafe to use.
Engineers should investigate failing test cases to determine the cause and
its impact on safety. Quantifying confidence using this technique might
be dangerous if it is used to justify forgoing such investigation.
D.4.2 Confidence in Evidence
Analysts using the proposed technique assess evidence in the abstract.
But a thing is evidence only by virtue of having been cited in support of
a claim and might lend more support to some claims than to others [47].
The opinions in Table D1 make sense only if applied to evidence–claim
pairs, e.g. the analyst’s opinion of Sn1’s support for G2 is ⇡(0.7, 0.2, 0.1).
D.4.3 Confidence in the Hazard Analysis
The original example asserts the completeness of the hazard analysis in
context element C1 in Figure D1. In GSN, propositions should appear
as goals, not context [3, 46]. Because the completeness of the hazard
analysis appears as context, confidence in completeness is excluded from
the calculated confidence and uncertainty in the main safety claim G1
despite the obvious impact that it would have on safety.
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Appendix E
Guiochet, Hoang, and Kaaˆniche
Guiochet, Hoang, and Kaaˆniche propose a technique for assessing confi-
dence in an existing assurance case using Dempster–Shafer theory [29].
E.1 Proposed Technique.
The proposed technique models confidence in a conclusion as the strength
of belief that the conclusion is true (Equation E1), defines uncertainty as
the lack of belief that the conclusion is either true or false (Equation E2),
and rules out disbelief (which presumably should not be included in the
argument):
m(A) = Bel(A) = g(A) 2 [0, 1] (E1)
m(A, A¯) = 1  g(A) 2 [0, 1] (E2)
m(A¯) = 0 (E3)
Conclusion Supported by a Single Premise. The paper defines
confidence in a goal A supported by a solution or goal B as
g(A) = p ⇤ g(B) (E4)
where p represents confidence in the inference. The paper does not spec-
ify how to obtain values of p.
Alternative Arguments. The paper defines alternative arguments as
arguments where either of two premises B or C support conclusion A.
The technique models these using the noisy-or function:
g(A) = p ⇤ g(B) + q ⇤ g(C)  g(B) ⇤ g(C) ⇤ p ⇤ q (E5)
The paper does not specify how to obtain the weighting factors p and q.
Complementary Arguments. The paper defines arguments where “a
set of solutions or subgoals are required simultaneously for supporting
the main goal” as complementary arguments. The proposed technique
models confidence in complementary arguments using a variant of the
leaky-noisy-and function. The paper defines this function in terms of the
truth table given in Table E1 and the following equation for v:
v =
p+ q
2
(E6)
The paper then generalizes to a conclusion X based on n premises:
v =
1
n
nX
i=1
pi (E7)
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g(B) 1 0
g(C) 1 0 1 0
g(A) v v.(1  q) v.(1  p) 0
Table E1: Truth table for conclusion C supported through complementary
argument by premises B and C [29]. The value of v is given by Equation E6.
Goal A Context D
Goal B Goal C
(a) GSN argument
A
B C D
(b) BBN model
Figure E1: Representing a complementary argument with two sub-goals and a
context element (a) as a BBN (b). Taken from [29].
g(X|Y¯1, . . . , Y¯k) = v.
kY
i=1
(1  pi) (E8)
For complementary arguments with context, the paper proposes model-
ing the conclusion as the noisy-and of the two premises and the context
as shown in Figure E1. The paper does not specify how to obtain the
needed weighting parameters.
Test for Argument Su ciency. The paper does not specify how to
use the computed likelihood of a main safety claim to decide whether to
release a safety-critical system into service.
E.2 Replication
The paper does not present a worked example that we could replicate.
E.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
The paper asserts that “providing quantitative estimation of confidence
is an interesting approach to manage complexity of arguments” [29]. This
implies that a benefit of quantification is reduced need for careful reading
of the argument. (The act of computing confidence does not change
the argument structure. To reduce the di culty of assessing complex
arguments, the task of quantitative confidence assessment must replace a
more di cult task. Presumably, that task is reading and understanding
the argument.) But arguments have purposes other than supporting
release-to-service decisions. For example, safety arguments communicate
the system safety rationale to those who, years on, will maintain or
modify the system.
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The paper notes that one of the central features of the technique, “the
constraint m(X, X¯) = 0, brings the main benefit of letting [analysts] use
mathematical tools, such as BBN.” This constraint might facilitate tool
reuse, but the paper presents no evidence that the resulting computations
are useful. The paper refers to “an experiment on a real case study of
a rehabilitation robot,” citing a Ph.D. thesis available only in French,
but do not relate the study method or results or connect these to a
specific claim about the technique. Instead, the authors explicitly limit
their conclusions to computational feasibility: “in this paper, we focus
only on the feasibility of a quantitative estimation of confidence.” But a
feasible technique must also be accurate if it is to be fit for use.
E.4 Counterargument
Since the paper does not present a worked example that we could repli-
cate, we could not attempt to falsify an e cacy hypothesis by finding
plausible alternatives that yield implausible results. But we note two
problems with the proposed technique in addition to the usual problem
of obtaining the required probability factors, weights, and leak factors.
Incompleteness and Inconsistency. The proposed combination rule
for complementary arguments is both incomplete and inconsistent. The
paper does not define the result when belief in the premises is neither 0
nor 1. Furthermore, Equation E8 is incompatible with the truth table
given in Table E1. We assume that the authors meant n rather than k
and pi rather than pi. But even so, Equation E8 does not produce the
value for two false premises shown in Table E1 unless pi = 1 for some i.
Context is Not a Proposition. The proposed technique models the
impact of GSN context elements as though they were propositions, but
they are not. While the precise meaning and function of GSN context
elements are not clear [46], the notion of belief in the truth or falsehood of
context is incompatible with example context elements given in the GSN
standard [3]. For example, it is meaningless to speak of the degree of
belief in the truth of the phrases “Operating Role and Context,” “Control
System Definition,” or “SIL Guidelines and Processes” because none of
these are propositions.
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Appendix F
Guo
Guo proposes representing safety arguments based on conformance to
standards as Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) [30].
F.1 Proposed Technique
The paper does not define a specific structure for the networks or recom-
mend a specific formula or method for populating node probability tables
beyond the recommendation to “gathe[r] data from objective and sub-
jective sources, such as the historical dependability of similar system, the
competence of the developer, the methods and process deployed.” The
paper does not specify how to use the computed probability of a safety
claim to decide whether to release a safety-critical system into service.
However, it does provide an example BBN for calculating the quality of
a safety requirements specification. Figure F1 presents that example.
F.2 Replication
The paper does not provide node probabilities for the example given in
Figure F1. We were thus unable to replicate the example.
F.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
The paper reasons that because “BBNs are based on Bayes’ theory and
have a sound mathematical background,” they “provide a quantitative
figure for evaluating safety from probabilistic meaning.” This reasoning
is too vague to accept: without knowing what properties are meant and
how these relate to the technique’s fitness for use, a reader cannot assess
either the premise that BBNs have these properties or that having these
properties makes the technique fit for use. The paper continues,
The graphic representation of BBNs is intuitive in nature
. . . . By using BBNs, safety assessment hence becomes more
intuitive and understandable, thereby more e ciently and
e↵ectively.
The paper neither specifies what form of representation (e.g., a prose text
accomplishment summary, a prose text safety argument, or a graphical
safety argument) this hypothesis compares BBNs to nor identifies evi-
dence supporting this hypothesis. The authors conclude,
We build an initial prototype BBN for systematic safety as-
sessment to a certain phase of life cycle of IEC 61508. Some
factors, such as sta↵, budget, complexity of problem, time
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Quality of Hazard 
and risk analysis
Correctness of 
techniques applied
Staff-related 
factor
Quality of safety 
function requirement
Complexity 
of problem
Quality of safety 
integrity requirement
Omission Misunder-standing Conflict
Over-
low
Over-
high
Quality of overall 
safety requirement
Quality of requirement specification
Completeness Correctness Focus on safety Consistency
Figure F1: “The initial BBN topology for systematically assessing overall
safety requirement” from [30]. For consistency with other BBNs in this paper,
we represent nodes as rectangles rather than ovals.
requirement, and development hardware environment, have
been carefully thought about in this BBN prototype. The
novel points of this BBN include improved transparency, ob-
jective and quantitative assessment, changing purely subjec-
tive views about conformance and etc.
Again, it is not clear what the paper is comparing BBNs against. In any
case, the paper presents no empirical evidence to show that a BBN-based
quantitative assessment of a safety case provides a trustworthy basis for
deciding whether to release a system into service.
F.4 Counterargument
We could not create a counterexample similar to the BBN shown in
Figure F1 because that example is itself implausible for two reasons.
First, it is meaningless to describe the “quality of [a] safety integrity
requirement” as “over-high.” Second, the di↵erence between the Quality
of overall safety requirement and Quality of requirement specification nodes
is unclear. A requirement specification is not its requirements, much less
a single requirement, and might contain requirements that are not safety-
related. But if the latter node was meant to represent these broader
concerns, it would depend on nodes representing them. It does not.
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Appendix G
Hobbs and Lloyd
Hobbs and Lloyd propose representing assurance arguments as Bayesian
Belief Networks (BBNs) [20].
G.1 Proposed Technique
The paper proposes representing an assurance cases as “a BBN where
each leaf . . . represents elementary evidence and the network’s structure
represents the argument.” The authors refer to the SafEty and Risk
Evaluation using bayesian NEts (SERENE) method manual [23] for its
patterns but suggest that the noisy-or and noisy-and functions might
model assurance case reasoning better than simple or and and functions.
The Noisy-Or Function. The paper defines noisy-or as
p(X|Y1, . . . , YN ) = 1  (1  k)
Y
i:Yi
(1  pi) (G1)
where X is the child (conclusion) node, Y1 . . . YN are the N parent
(premise) nodes, and k is the level of confidence in X when all of the
parent nodes are false (k = p(Y¯1 . . . , Y¯N )).
The Noisy-And Function. The paper defines noisy-and as
p(X|Y1, . . . , YN ) = (1  k)
Y
i:Yi
(1  pi) (G2)
where k is a leakage factor such that 0.0  k  1.0. It does not identify
a means for analysts to obtain the leakage factors and weights that the
noisy-or and noisy-and functions require.
Test for Argument Su ciency. The paper does not specify what
probability of truth in a safety conclusion should be taken as su cient
to justify releasing a system into service. But it does note that
when the Bayesian calculation is first performed, it is proba-
ble that the final result will not be to the liking of the analyst:
the level of assurance may be too low. In this case a sensitiv-
ity calculation may be performed to find where the ‘biggest
bang can be achieved for the buck’.
Illustrative Example. The paper provides an example BBN to illus-
trate the proposed technique. Figure G1 shows this example. Table G1
and Table G2 give the example node probabilities.
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SM Defines 
System 
Safe State
SM Defines 
Product 
Scope
SM Defines 
Development 
Constraints
Application Develop-
ment Information is 
Available
Product 
Installation 
is Defined
SM is Supported 
by Product 
Documentation
SM has Enough 
Information for 
Application Development
Required User 
Competence 
is Defined
SM has been 
Reviewed Against 
Problem Reports
SM is Comprehensive
Safety Manual has been Approved by a Competent Authority
Figure G1: An example BBN taken from [20]. For compactness and consis-
tency with other BBNs in this paper, we represent nodes as rectangles. The
abbreviation SM stands for safety manual.
G.2 Hypotheses and Evidence
The paper hypothesizes that a benefit of using BBNs to show how ev-
idence substantiates dependability claims is that it “provides fewer op-
portunities for flaws in the argument or inappropriate reliance on un-
trustworthy evidence.” But it neither specifies what this hypothesis
compares BBNs to—e.g., prose text arguments or arguments rendered
in Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [3] or Claims-Argument-Evidence
notation [57]—nor provides supporting evidence. The paper concludes,
Preparing an assurance case for a complex system, partic-
ularly one containing sophisticated software, by means of a
BBN allows activities to be separated cleanly: ‘how should
we argue about the evidence?’ and ‘what evidence should
we present?’. It prevents unstructured ‘dumping’ of material
into a document by forcing the role of each piece of material
to be considered individually. We have found that auditors to
whom we have presented these cases have welcomed the struc-
tured argument. In summary, applying a BBN to represent
an assurance case, when backed by a suitable computation
tool, appears to be a flexible and powerful technique.
This e cacy hypothesis is unclear. Would auditors find a BBN more or
less accessible than, for example, an argument presented in GSN? Does
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Node False True
SM has been reviewed against problem reports 0.2 0.8
Required user competence is defined 0.2 0.8
SM has been approved by competent authority 0.0 1.0
SM is supported by product documentation 0.1 0.9
Product installation is defined 0.6 0.4
SM defines development constraints 0.2 0.8
SM defines system safe state 0.0 1.0
SM defines product scope 0.2 0.8
Application development information is available See Table G2
SM has enough information for application development Not given
SM is comprehensive Not given
Table G1: Example node probability inputs for the BBN shown in Figure G1,
taken from [20].
SM defines SM defines SM defines False True
development product system
constraints scope safe state
False False False 0.952 0.048
False False True 0.760 0.240
False True False 0.920 0.080
False True True 0.600 0.400
True False False 0.880 0.120
True False True 0.400 0.600
True True False 0.800 0.200
True True True 0.000 1.000
Table G2: Example truth table for Application development information is avail-
able in the BBN shown in Figure G1, taken from [20].
being ‘powerful’ mean that the conclusion reached by BBN analysis is
su ciently trustworthy to use as the basis for a decision to release a
system to service? In any case, the paper presents no evidence of e cacy
other the the authors’ anecdotal experience.
G.3 Replication
The paper provides observations for all leaf nodes and a conditional
probability table for the Application Development Information is Available
node. But it does not provide conditional probability tables for the other
non-leaf nodes. While we could not replicate the complete example, we
were able to implement the Application development information is avail-
able and supporting nodes in a BBN tool. The result is that Application
development information is available is 19.04% false and 80.96% true.
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G.4 Counterargument
We do not understand the meanings of the propositions each node rep-
resents well enough to formulate plausible alternatives to the original
example. For example, we do not know how true Application develop-
ment information is available must be if development is to proceed. The
example permits this to be up to 20% true even if the safety manual
providing that information does not define a safe state. It can be up to
60% true if the manual does not define product scope. These di culties
preclude generating an example that is close enough to the original to
clearly be an application of the proposed technique.
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Appendix H
Nair, Walkinshaw, Kelly, and de la Vara
Nair, Walkinshaw, Kelly, and de la Vara propose to use Evidential Rea-
soning (ER) to calculate belief in a safety claim [21,22,31].
H.1 Proposed Technique
One paper describes an approach based on expert assessment of the
solution elements in Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) arguments [21]:
Through a series of generic and specific questions about the
solution, the expert will set out their assessment (ranging
from a scale of 0–5) and their confidence (a quantified value
of confidence level e.g., in percentage) in the satisfaction of
the claim. ER will then propagate these beliefs through the
GSN structure to yield an overall assessment of the system.
That paper leaves both further development and assessment and of the
technique to future work.
A later paper describes both (a) a pattern for representing the por-
tion of a confidence argument [7] related to a single evidence assertion in
the safety argument and (b) a tool for instantiating that pattern and per-
forming the ER calculations needed to compute overall confidence [22].
Figure H1 and Figure H2 present part of that pattern. The paper refers
to a paper on Evidential Reasoning for definitions of the equations used
to combine beliefs [39].
Representing Belief using ER. In the work the authors’ papers
reference, Evidential Reasoning defines a set of N evaluation grades
H = {H1, H2, . . . HN} [39]. An attribute y is defined in terms of “L basic
attributes ei (i = 1, . . . , L).” The “weights of the attributes are given by
! = {!1!2 . . .!i . . .!L} where !i is the relative weight of the ith basic
attribute (ei) with 0  !i  1.” An assessment “ei (i = 1, . . . , L) of an
alternative may be . . . represented as
S(ei) = {(Hn, n,i) , n = 1, . . . , N} i = 1, . . . , L (H1)
where  n,i   0, PNn=1  n,i  1, and  n,i denotes a degree of belief.” The
probability mass associated with the belief in attribute ei is split into
N +2 categories. The first N parts of the mass, mn,i, each represent one
of the evaluation grades. Another part, m¯H,i represents the “part of the
remaining probability mass that is not yet assigned to individual grades
due to the fact that attribute i (denoted by ei) only plays one part in
the assessment relative to its weight.” The final part, m˜H,i, represents
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Figure H1: The proposed GSN pattern for confidence in a GSN solution solv-
ing a goal [22]. The complete pattern contains thirty-six mandatory, four op-
tional, and four repeat-as-necessary elements. Instantiating the pattern and
citing evidence requires a minimum of fifty-one GSN elements.
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Figure H2: The pattern begun in Figure H1, continued. For brevity, we do
not present the entirety of the pattern.
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the “part of the remaining probability mass unassigned to individual
grades, which is caused due to the incompleteness in the assessment.”
The probability mass can be calculated from beliefs and weights:
mn,i = !i n,i n = 1, . . . , N (H2)
m¯H,i = 1  !i (H3)
m˜H,i = !i
 
1 
NX
n=1
 n,i
!
(H4)
Combining Belief Masses Using ER. The probability masses cor-
responding to the assessments S(ei) and S(ej) for attributes ei and ej
can be combined into a joint mass:
mn,i j = Ki j (mn,imn,j +mH,imn,j +mn,imH,j) (H5)
m˜H,i j = Ki j (m˜H,im˜H,j + m¯H,im˜H,j + m˜H,im¯H,j) (H6)
m¯H,i j = Ki jm¯H,im¯H,j (H7)
mH,i = m¯H,i + m˜H,i (H8)
Ki j =
0BBBB@1 
NX
t=1
NX
l = 1
l 6= t
mt,iml,j
1CCCCA
 1
(H9)
When there are more than two basic attributes, analysts apply Equations
H5–H9 recursively, first calculating the joint mass for attributes one and
two, then applying the equations again to join the resulting joint mass
with the mass for attribute three, and so on. After obtaining the joint
mass for y, an analyst can calculate belief in y using the following:
 n,y =
mn,y
1  m¯H,y (H10)
 H,y =
m˜H,y
1  m¯H,y (H11)
Representing Confidence in Safety Arguments. The authors in-
stantiate evaluation grades for safety arguments as
H1 Very low
H2 Low
H3 Moderate
H4 High
H5 Very high
In the proposed use of Evidential Reasoning, attribute y is a GSN goal
and the basic attributes are supporting goals or evidence [22]. The papers
do not specify how to obtain the necessary weights.
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Overall Confidence
[in a single evidence assertion]
Trustworthiness Appropriateness
Process Personnel Tools
Competency Independence
Intent Role
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.2
0.6 0.4
0.7 0.3
0.5
Figure H3: Example weights taken from [22]. We note that this example does
not directly correspond to the proposed confidence argument pattern (Figure H1).
Belief distribution
Question Answer Confidence  1  2  3  4  5
Q1 Yes 80% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
Q2 Absolutely 100% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Q3 Maybe 50% 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Q4 Yes 80% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
Table H1: The assessments for the partial example given in the paper [22].
Test for Argument Su ciency. The paper does not specify how to
use computed confidence to determine whether a system is safe enough
to put into service.
Illustrative Example. One paper provides a partial example set of
weights and an example calculation of trustworthiness in a hazard log [22].
Figure H3 presents the example weights, which do not correspond to ei-
ther the confidence argument pattern shown in Figure H1 or the weights
shown in Figure H3. The paper’s presentation of the example calculation
begins by defining four checklist questions that the argument assessor
would answer:
Q1. “If independence is required, is the person doing the verification
di↵erent than the one responsible for developing the hazard log?
Q2. “Is the manager to whom the team reports identified so that it can
be confirmed that the requirements on independence are met?
Q3. “Are there records of attendance/participation in hazard identifica-
tion workshops/exercises of the personnel that include the name,
organisation and role?
Q4. “Is there information on the competency of the personnel?”
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Trustworthiness [of a hazard log]
Independence Competence
Q3 Q4
[0.5?] [0.5?]
[0.5?] [0.5?]
Q1 Q2
0.5 0.5
Figure H4: Example weights for reasoning about the trustworthiness of a
hazard log taken from [22]. The figures in brackets are not presented in the
paper; we arrived at them by reverse engineering.
These questions are answered using a di↵erent Likert scale:
H1 Definitely not
H2 No
H3 Maybe
H4 Yes
H5 Absolutely
Table H1 gives the assessments for each question. Figure H4 gives the
weights with which these are combined.
H.2 Replication
Using the figures and structure presented in Table H1 and Figure H4, we
reproduced the calculations shown in the papers. We did not use the au-
thors’ experimental EviCA tool because the authors declined our request
for access to it. Using spreadsheet software, we calculated the belief in
the trustworthiness of the hazard log to be  1 = 0.000,  2 = 0.000,
 3 = 0.099,  4 = 0.452, and  5 = 0.281, with uncertainty  H = 0.168.
These figures match those in the paper. The paper gives the following
direction for turning these belief figures into a qualitative description:
To represent the assessor’s confidence in the trustworthiness
of the hazard log, we treat the final distribution of the assess-
ment as a five point Likert-scale: Very Low, Low, Medium,
High, and Very High. . . . To best represent the assessor’s
confidence, in our approach we use the median of the distri-
bution. In the above distribution, the median is 0.099, which
corresponds to Medium in the Likert scale. . . . To represent
the assessor’s confidence in their assessment, we quantify con-
fidence from a scale of 0–100%, with intervals: 0–20% Very
Low, 20–40% Low, 40–60% Medium, 60–80% High, and 80–
100% Very High.
We note that following this procedure would always result in an assess-
ment of Medium trustworthiness regardless of the calculations. It might
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be supposed that the authors meant the median of the non-zero elements
of the distribution. But that interpretation would yield an assessment
of High, not Medium, trustworthiness in this case.
H.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
One paper about the proposed technique points out that it is based on
a theory with desirable properties, contends that tool support will make
it feasible, and reports a survey-based assessment [22].
Properties of ER. One paper, citing Yang and Xu [39], reports that
the Evidential Reasoning approach
obeys certain desirable axioms that ensure the following:
1. If none of the basic attributes for y is assessed at a grade
Hn, then  n,y = 0.
2. If all of its basic attributes are assessed to a grade Hn
then  n,y = 1.
3. If all of the basic attributes are completely assessed to a
subset of evaluation grades then y should be completely
assessed to the same subset of grades.
4. If, for a basic attribute z,
Pn
i=0  i,z < 1, then the same
holds for y:
Pn
i=0  i,y < 1 [22].
These properties, while desirable, are not su cient to show that applying
the proposed technique will result in a trustworthy assessment of confi-
dence. Rules that would produce di↵erent assessments of confidence also
satisfy these criteria. For example, one might define the combination y
of assessments of premises a and b as the categorical weaker of the two,
 n,y = min( n,a, n,b) (H12)
or the categorical mean of the two,
 n,y =
 n,a +  n,b
2
(H13)
Tool Support Makes the Approach Feasible. The proposed tech-
nique requires instantiating the large pattern shown in Figure H1 many
times. The paper argues that tool support makes this practical by gen-
erating argument graphics from user input about assessments, context,
user-specific confidence factors, etc. given through dialog boxes. But
gathering and supplying that data might itself be a large expense. More-
over, the paper presents no evidence to show that resulting large argu-
ment would have practical value to any reader. If the pattern’s purpose
is to facilitate calculating the confidence in a claim rooted directly in
evidence, and if confidence figures actually encapsulate confidence, why
render this confidence argument fragment graphically at all?
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Evaluation by Survey. The authors evaluated the proposed technique
and the EviCA tool by surveying twenty-one safety experts that were per-
sonally selected by the authors or recruited through a social networking
website (LinkedIn). The subjects viewed a presentation and then re-
sponded to survey questions. When asked whether “use of the approach
will lead to more accurate safety evidence assessments,” four strongly
agreed, nine agreed, and eight neither agreed nor disagreed.
It is not clear that the reported survey provides much support for
the hypothesis that the technique is a trustworthy basis for making
release-to-service decisions. This is in part due to weaknesses that af-
fect survey research generally: surveys are a↵ected by response biases,
including those related to demand characteristics. For example, survey
respondents sometimes feel compelled to be ‘good subjects’ by giving re-
sponses they think support the researchers’ hypothesis [44]. Researchers
can limit response bias through measures such as deliberately hiding the
hypothesis from subjects, but the papers describe no such controls.
The other main threat to validity is that respondents are not known
to be capable of accurately assessing e cacy. E cacy might depend
on subtle matters of degree such as analysts’ skill in choosing weights
and making judgments. If experimental and observational assessments of
e cacy and its contributory factors were available to respondents, their
opinions might synthesize this evidence. Without such data, it is not
clear that participants’ opinions on e cacy are a measure of e cacy.
H.4 Counterargument
The example presented in the papers does not seem to be an applica-
tion of the proposed technique as defined, but rather a demonstration of
the ER equations the authors adopt from Yang and Xu. Nevertheless, a
variant of the example serves as a counterexample. Suppose (a) that two
safety engineers are known, by long history, to be hopelessly incompe-
tent to practice, (b) that they work independently (and that a manager
has documented this) and (c) that there is record of them attending
training. The answers to questions Q1–Q4 above might plausibly be
absolutely, with very high confidence. (The engineers’ history of incom-
petence is “information on the competency of the personnel” even if it
shows incompetence.) Using the proposed technique, one might conclude
with very high confidence that the trustworthiness of the hazard log that
one of the incompetent engineers compiles and the other verifies is very
high. This is not plausible.
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Appendix I
The SERENE Partners
The partners of the Safety and Risk Evaluation Using Bayesian Nets
(SERENE) project propose using Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) to
model system safety and compute risk [23].
I.1 Proposed Technique
The SERENE manual defines a number of idioms (patterns) that the
analyst uses to model the system in question. The analyst populates
the node probability tables—the manual does not specify where the an-
alyst should get the needed data—and uses a BBN tool to perform the
computations.
I.2 Replication
The SERENE manual defines and gives examples of several idioms. Fig-
ure I1 depicts the manual’s instantiation of the definition/synthesis id-
iom for safety. The manual does not specify the function or conditional
probability for the Safety node, but we presume that safety decreases as
the product of failure frequency and severity increases. We were able to
instantiate the model in a BBN tool using continuous interval nodes.
I.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
The SERENE manual asserts that the SERENE method provides:
1. “Improved communication of safety”
2. “Greater focus on the properties which lead to safety”
3. “A basis for empirical validation of the beliefs of safety experts and
of the rationale for existing standards”
The manual does not specify the means of communication it compares
the proposed technique to. But similar conclusions might be made about
non-quantitative safety arguments in comparison to having no represen-
tation of what each system’s safety most depends on. The manual further
asserts that the use of BBNs provides two benefits:
1. “The uncertainty associated with the causes of safety can be in-
cluded in the model and the uncertainty about the overall system
safety is explicit”
2. “The safety achieved can be quantified, allowing alternative safety
strategies to be compared”
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Safety
Occurrence frequency Severity of failures
Figure I1: A BBN from [23] instantiating the definition/synthesis idiom for
safety. For consistency with Figure L1, we represent BBN nodes using rectan-
gles.
Variant Failure modes (< Frequency,Severity >) Risk
Good
⌦
10 9, 109
↵
,
⌦
10 9, 105
↵
,
⌦
10 7, 103
↵
,
⌦
10 3, 101
↵
1⇥ 101
Bad
⌦
10 9, 101
↵
,
⌦
10 9, 103
↵
,
⌦
10 7, 105
↵
,
⌦
10 3, 109
↵
1⇥ 106
Table I1: The failure modes and total risk of system variants to be modeled
using the argument in Figure I1. Risk is computed using Equation I1.
Again, the first conclusion could be made about any representation of
uncertainty, including lists of defeaters [6, 7, 9]. The manual provides
example BBNs but no empirical evidence that the computed results ac-
tually represent the “safety achieved.”
I.4 Counterargument
Our counterexample comprises two variants of a system, Good and Bad.
We define these so that they give rise to maximally distinct levels of risk
yet are evaluated identically according the idiom shown in Figure I1.
The Good and Bad Examples. The Good and Bad examples each
have four failure modes as shown in Table I1. Both use the same sets of
four frequency values and four severity values, but in the Good system
the most frequent failures are the least severe and vice-versa, while the
opposite is true in the Bad system. The risk column gives the system
risk as computed using a typical expected-value formulation:
Risk =
X
i:{Failure modes}
Frequencyi ⇥ Severityi (I1)
Analysis of Examples. It is easy to see that the Good system is
superior to Bad. The calculated risk bears this out. But both systems
would be modeled identically by the BBN shown in Figure I1. Table I2
gives the node probabilities that result if we use the equation
Safety = (Occurrence frequency⇥ Severity of failures) 1 (I2)
The technique calculates the same value of Safety for both the Good
and Bad variants. This is not only implausible but dangerous: any
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Node Distribution
Occurrence frequency [0, 10 8] , 10 6] , 10 4] , 10 2] , 1]
50% 25% 0% 25% 0%
Severity of failures [0, 102] , 104] , 106] , 108] ,1)
25% 25% 25% 0% 25%
Safety [0, 10 8] , 10 6] , 10 4] , 10 2] ,1)
0% 0% 25% 5% 70%
Table I2: The node probabilities for the BBN shown in Figure I1 and the
system variants defined in Table I1. We calculated Safety using the formula
Safety = (Occurrence frequency ⇥ Severity of failures) 1. The probabilities for
the Good and Bad variants are identical.
decision procedure based on the idiom calculation that would accept the
Good system as su ciently safe would accept the Bad system also.
It might be argued that we should have used an equation other than
Equation I2, that we have inappropriately combined information about
multiple failure modes into the Occurrence frequency and Severity of fail-
ures nodes, or that the manual used the word ‘safety’ where it meant
‘risk.’ But this counterexample survives such objections. The problem
that the counterexample reveals is the result of first reasoning separately
about the frequency and severity of system failure and then reasoning
about the resulting e↵ect on safety or risk. To avoid this problem, the
idiom could first reason separately about the risk contribution from each
failure mode (thus pairing only related frequencies and severities) and
then reason about the aggregate e↵ect of those contributions.
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Appendix J
Yamamoto
Yamamoto proposes annotating assurance arguments recorded in the
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) with attributes and using these to eval-
uate architectures “for quality claims, such as security and safety” [32].
J.1 Proposed Technique
In the proposed technique, analysts annotate GSN solution elements with
attributes and then use rules to assess goals starting from the bottom of
the goal structure and working upwards.
Scale for Annotations. The technique rates confidence on a five-point
Likert scale:
 2 Strongly unsatisfied
 1 Unsatisfied
0 Unknown
1 Satisfied
2 Strongly satisfied
Assessing Goals Supported by a Solution. Goals supported by a
single solution inherit the attribute of that solution. The paper does
not specify how to combine attributes when a goal is supported by more
than one solution.
Assessing Goals Supported by Subgoals. When a goal is supported
through a strategy by k premises, the analyst annotates the strategy with
a unit vector of weights for the premises. These weights are denoted
Q1 . . . Qk. The analyst then calculates the attribute P of the conclusion
goal using the formula
P =
X
i=1,k
Qi ⇤Ri (J1)
where R1 . . . Rk are the attributes of the premises. (The paper defines
P as
P
i=1,kQi ⇤ Ri ⇤Wi, where
P
i=1,kWi = 1, but does not define Wi
or use it in its illustrative example [32]. Since Wi and Qi are both unit
weighting vectors, we eliminate Wi from our discussion for simplicity.)
The paper does not specify how to propagate attributes when goals
directly solve other goals as is explicitly permitted in GSN [3].
Test for Argument Su ciency. The paper does not specify how to
use the computed values to decide whether an architecture is acceptable.
Since the technique is proposed as a means of assessing architectures, not
complete systems, it is not surprising that the paper also does not specify
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how to use computed values to decide whether a system is su ciently
safe to put into service.
Illustrative Example. The paper illustrates the proposed technique
using an example assurance argument for a local-area network (LAN)
device management system (LDMS) [32]. Figure J1 depicts this example.
The figures in angle brackets are attributes (P ) in the case of goals and
solutions and weights (Q1 . . . Qk) in the case of strategies.
J.2 Replication
Given the goal structure and attributes provided in the paper and repro-
duced in Figure J1, we were able to reproduce the author’s calculations.
J.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
The paper describes its example as a “case study” but does not contain
information usually found in case study reports such as descriptions of
the study method, the data collected, and how these data relate to the
questions at issue [58]. Nevertheless, it concludes that
the case study on the LDMS was executed to evaluate the
e↵ectiveness of the GSN attribute method . . . . The result
showed the propagation from evidences to the top claim in
GSN is easy and traceable. This showed that the e↵ectiveness
of the attribute propagation method. Although the evalua-
tion was only executed for one example, it is clear the easiness
on the GSN attribute propagation can be derived for other
applications. . . . Discussions based on the case study showed
the e↵ectiveness and appropriateness of the proposed method
to resolve security and safety issues simultaneously.
J.4 Counterargument
The paper’s example argues that the LDMS is safe because each of its
major components is safe and that a monitor component is safe because
“abnormal events are defined.” This is not plausible: it is not clear
what it means for a component to be safe in isolation, the argument
presents no evidence that component interactions do not produce unsafe
behavior, and defining abnormal events is only the first step to detect-
ing and mitigating them. Since any variants of this argument would
be equally implausible, we used a di↵erent argument to assess the pro-
posed technique. Figure J2 gives our specimen safety argument, which is
for an unspecified system with 2–10 hazards. Our counterexample uses
three variants of this argument: Optimistic, Poor Evidence 1, and Poor
Evidence 2. These examples show two problems with the proposed tech-
nique: (a) it allows evidence for the mitigation of some hazards to mask
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Figure J1: An example annotated GSN assurance argument taken from [32].
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G3. All identified hazards 
have been eliminated or 
sufficiently mitigated
G1. The system is 
sufficiently safe to operate
C1. System description, operating 
context description, applicable 
residual risk acceptance test, etc.
C2. “Identified hazards” 
are those listed in the 
Hazard Log
S2. Argument over all 
identified hazards
G4. Hazard H1 has 
been {eliminated or 
sufficiently 
mitigated}
G13. Hazard H10 has been 
sufficiently mitigated
Sn1.
Opinion of 
responsible 
engineer
G2. All significant 
hazards have 
been identified
S1. Argument over hazard 
identification and mitigation
G12. Hazard H9 has 
been {eliminated or 
sufficiently 
mitigated}
. . .
Figure J2: The specimen safety argument we created and used to assess the
proposed technique. The Optimistic and Poor Evidence 1 examples have all
elements, but the Poor Evidence 2 example lacks goals G5–G13.
poor information about the mitigation of others, and (b) assessments
depend on the arbitrary scope of hazards.
Optimistic Example. In the original example, the assessment of ev-
ery solution that indirectly supports the claim of safety is 2 (strongly
satisfied). In our Optimistic example, we correspondingly give a value
of 2 to G2, Sn1, and all instantiations of G4. Since each component in
the original example had equal weight, we use equal weight for S1 and
S2. Using the technique’s propagation rules, we calculate that G3 and
G1 also have value 2. These values are optimistic—evidence of safety is
rarely, if ever, perfect—but mirror the original example, which assesses
the claim that the “LDMS is safe” as 2 (strongly satisfied).
Poor Evidence 1 and 2 Examples. Our Poor Evidence 1 and Poor
Evidence 2 variants of the Optimistic example suppose that we have very
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Element Optimistic Poor Evidence 1 Poor Evidence 2
G2, G4 2.00
G5–G13 2.00 N/A
Sn1, G14 2.00 -1.00
S1, S2 Equal weights
G3 2.00 1.70 0.50
G1 2.00 1.85 1.25
Table J1: Attribute values for the Optimistic, Poor Evidence 1, and Poor
Evidence 2 variants of the safety argument in Figure J2.
poor evidence to show that one of the hazards is adequately mitigated.
Figure J2 shows that the only evidence cited in support of the claim
that hazard H10 has been su ciently mitigated is the opinion of the re-
sponsible engineer (Sn1). Suppose that the engineer’s opinion is that the
hazard probably isn’t mitigated. We thus assess Sn1 as  1 (unsatisfied)
for both examples. The di↵erence between the Optimistic and Poor Ev-
idence 1 examples is the assessment of Sn1. The only di↵erence between
the Poor Evidence 1 and 2 examples is that in the latter, safety engineers
have defined hazard H1 so that its scope encompasses the system states
defined by hazards H1–H9 in the former.
Analysis of Examples. Table J1 gives the calculated attributes of the
main safety claim, G1. In the Optimistic case, the attribute of G1 is 2
(strongly satisfied). But in the Poor Evidence 1 case, the attribute of
G1 is 1.85. That is, we should be strongly satisfied that the system is
safe even though all that we know about one of its hazards is that, in
the responsible engineer’s opinion, it is insu ciently mitigated. These
examples show that the proposed technique allows evidence for the mit-
igation of some hazards to mask poor information about the mitigation
of others.
The Poor Evidence 1 and Poor Evidence 2 examples di↵er only in
the scope of the hazard definitions: the system states defined as hazards
H1–H9 in the former are defined as hazard H1 in the latter. The same
hazardous system states are mitigated in the same way as shown by the
same evidence. Yet the calculated attribute for the main safety claim
G1 is 1.85 (strongly satisfied) in the former case and 1.25 (satisfied)
in the latter case. These examples show that the proposed technique
produces assessments that depend on arbitrary hazard scope. But it is
not plausible than an arbitrary di↵erence in hazard scope should change
our confidence in system safety.
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Appendix K
Zeng, Lu, and Zhong
Zeng, Lu, and Zhong propose using Dempster–Shafer theory to assess
the confidence in arguments recorded in the Goal Structuring Notation
(GSN) [3, 24].
K.1 Proposed Technique
The proposed technique defines confidence on a 5-point Likert scale and
uses an improved Dempster’s rule to assess confidence in conclusions.
Confidence Scale. The technique defines confidence in an assurance
argument claim as a probability mass distributed over six confidence and
uncertainty categories:
A1 Very low confidence
A2 Low confidence
A3 Medium confidence
A4 High confidence
A5 Very high confidence
✓ Unknown confidence / uncertainty in assessment
Source of Data. Assessments of claims based directly on evidence “can
be obtained by [using the] Delphi Method.” Weights (wi) for each sub-
goal’s contribution to a parent goal “can be obtained by [using the] Ana-
lytic Hierarchy Process Method.” Weights sum to 1 for each conclusion.
Test for Argument Su ciency. The paper does not describe how to
use the calculated values to decide whether an argument is su cient to
justify fielding a system.
Illustrative Example. Figure K1 depicts the example argument given
in the paper. Table K1 gives the belief masses for the goals in Figure K1.
Table K2 gives the weights for the inferences depicted in Figure K1.
K.2 Replication
The equations in the paper contain typos. Moreover, the paper uses
multiple assessments of the confidence in some premises to illustrate
various scenarios and it is not clear which assessments were used to
derive which assessments of confidence in the conclusion. However, we
were able to reverse-engineer combination rules that roughly correspond
with those given in the paper and produce the computed masses shown
in the paper.
82
E1
.
an
aly
sis
 
re
su
lt
E3
.
M
et
ho
d 
Ev
ide
nc
e
E2
.
sy
ste
m
 
te
sti
ng
 
re
su
lt
G1
. E
ng
ine
 so
ftw
ar
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
ion
s t
o 
sy
ste
m
 L
ev
el 
Ha
za
rd
s a
re
 a
cc
ep
ta
ble
C1
. 1
. D
efi
nit
ion
 o
f s
of
tw
ar
e 
 2
. 
Co
nt
rib
ut
ion
 lis
t t
o 
sy
ste
m
 h
az
ar
ds S
1.
 A
rg
um
en
t 
ov
er
 a
ll i
de
nt
ifie
d 
so
ftw
ar
e 
sa
fe
ty 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
S2
. A
rg
um
en
t o
ve
r 
so
ftw
ar
e 
de
ve
lop
m
en
t 
to
 th
e 
int
eg
rit
y l
ev
el 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 to
 th
e 
ha
za
rd
s i
nv
olv
ed
C2
. 1
. s
af
et
y 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t d
efi
nit
ion
  2
. 
lis
t o
f s
af
et
y r
eq
uir
em
en
t 
[si
c] 
(R
ef
 X
)
C3
. I
nt
eg
rit
y
lev
el 
pr
oc
es
s 
gu
ide
lin
es
 
de
fin
ed
 b
y R
ef
 Y
[si
c]
G2
. A
ll i
de
nt
ifie
d 
so
ftw
ar
e 
sa
fe
ty 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts 
sa
tis
fie
d
G3
. E
ng
ine
 so
ftw
ar
e 
de
ve
lop
ed
 to
 In
te
gr
ity
 L
ev
el 
2
G4
. 
Re
qu
ire
-
m
en
t ‘s
ta
rt 
co
nt
ro
l’ i
s 
sa
tis
fie
d
G5
. R
eq
uir
e-
m
en
t ‘a
nt
i-
as
th
m
a 
co
nt
ro
l’ [
sic
] 
is 
sa
tis
fie
d
G6
. 
Re
qu
ire
-
m
en
t ‘a
nt
i-
ice
 co
nt
ro
l’ 
is 
sa
tis
fie
d
G7
. 
Re
qu
ire
-
m
en
t ‘s
ign
al 
m
on
ito
rin
g’ 
is 
sa
tis
fie
d
G8
. I
m
p.
 o
f 
m
et
ho
d 
or
 
te
ch
no
log
y 
m
ee
ts 
In
te
gr
ity
 
Le
ve
l 2
G9
. 
Im
p.
 o
f 
to
ol 
m
ee
ts 
In
te
gr
ity
 
Le
ve
l 2
G9
 [s
ic
]. 
Im
p.
 o
f 
en
vir
on
m
en
t 
m
ee
ts 
In
te
gr
ity
 
Le
ve
l 2
G9
 [s
ic
]. 
Im
p.
 o
f 
ot
he
r 
m
ee
ts 
In
te
gr
ity
 
Le
ve
l 2
E4
.
To
ol 
Ev
ide
nc
e
E5
.
En
vir
on
-
m
en
t 
Ev
ide
nc
e
E6
.
Ot
he
r 
Ev
ide
nc
e
Figure K1: An example “fragment of the safety case of engine software,” taken
from [24] and depicted in GSN [3]. We assume that (i) the second and third
goal G9 are meant to be goals G10 and G11, (ii) strategy S1 should really appear
between goal G2 and supporting goals G4–G7, (iii) strategy S2 should appear
between goal G3 and supporting goals G8–G10, and (iv) goal G1 is supported by
goals G2 and G3.
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Lower  Confidence ! Higher Unknown
Goal (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (✓)
G4 0.03 0.10 0.48 0.34 0.05 0.00
G5 0.10 0.10 0.35 0.37 0.05 0.03
G6 0.02 0.10 0.46 0.36 0.05 0.01
G7 0.01 0.10 0.53 0.29 0.05 0.02
G8 0.00 0.05 0.31 0.47 0.17 0.00
G9 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.54 0.18 0.00
G10 0.00 0.05 0.28 0.58 0.08 0.01
G11 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.55 0.05 0.02
Table K1: Original belief probability masses m4 . . .m7 for the goals directly
supported by evidence (G4–G11) in Figure K1 [24].
Premise Claim Weight (!)
G2 G1 0.731
G3 G1 0.269
G4 G2 0.250
G5 G2 0.250
G6 G2 0.312
G7 G2 0.188
G8 G3 0.336
G9 G3 0.234
G10 G3 0.257
G11 G3 0.173
Table K2: Weights for inferences in Figure K1 [24].
The Improved Dempster’s Rule. Equation K1 and its supporting
equations give the part of the combination of masses m1 and m2 that
correspond to confidence level Ai in terms of the masses of the premises
(m1 and m2) and the weights of each premise toward the conclusion (!i).
Equation K2 and its supporting equations give the part of the combina-
tion of masses that corresponds to unknown confidence (✓). When more
than two premises support a conclusion, the analyst applies Equations
K1 and K2 applied repeatedly (to combine the first two, and then the
result with the third, and so on) and the maximum weight to be used in
Equations K3 and K4 is the maximum of all n premises.
(m1  m2)(Ai) = m
0
1 (Ai)m
0
2 (Ai) +m
0
1 (✓)m
0
2 (Ai) +m
0
1 (Ai)m
0
2 (✓)
(m1  m2)00(✓) +
P
i(m1  m2)00(Ai)
(K1)
(m1  m2)(✓) = m
0
1 (✓)m
0
2 (✓)
(m1  m2)00(✓) +
P
i(m1  m2)00(Ai)
(K2)
m0i(Ak) =
!i
max({!1,!2, . . .!n})m (Ai) (K3)
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m0i(✓) =
!i
max({!1,!2, . . .!n})m (✓) +
✓
1  !i
max({!1,!2, . . .!n})
◆
(K4)
Using these and the belief mass and weight figures given in the paper,
we were able to compute the same belief mass m1 given in the paper
and shown in Table K4. Given the belief masses and weights used in the
example, medium (A3) confidence in safety is not implausible.
K.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
The paper presents an illustrative “experimental example” [24] but gives
no hypothesis to be tested, describes no independent or dependent vari-
ables, and discusses no threats to validity. The authors observe that
the belief values which are high before combination become
higher after combination, the belief values which are low be-
fore combination become lower after combination, [and] the
uncertainty become lower and lower during the combination
process . . . . In whole process, we can see G2 . . . is the more
degree contributions to the confidence in safety case, which
results are consistent with common sense. Therefore consid-
ered that [Dempster–Shafer] evidence theory in the applica-
tion of qualitative assessment is valid, and can better solve
uncertainty of assessment result . . . .
It is proved that [Dempster–Shafer] evidence theory has
advantages in evaluating confidence in safety case which has
some uncertainty. The usage of [Dempster–Shafer] evidence
theory reduced the e↵ect of the uncertainty, improved the
precision and the validity of the evaluation, and reduced the
blindness and the subjectivity of the evaluation of confidence
in safety case.
It is not clear what the proposed technique (or Dempster–Shafer theory
more broadly) is meant to be an improvement over. The paper describes
no study that compares it to any alternative.
K.4 Counterargument
We created two variants of the original example, Optimistic and Missing
Evidence, to illustrate that the proposed technique allows evidence that
some safety requirements are met to overcome a lack of evidence that
others are met. In the original example and our variants, goals G4–G7
in Figure K1 represent claims, backed by both “analysis” and “system
testing,” that the system satisfies each of its four safety requirements. In
the original example, the bulk of the belief mass in each is spread over
medium (A3) and high (A4) confidence.
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Lower  Confidence ! Higher Unknown
Goal (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (✓)
G4–G6 (O) 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.83 0.02
G4–G6 (ME) 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.83 0.02
G7 (O) 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.83 0.02
G7 (ME) 0.83 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02
Table K3: Belief probability masses m4 . . .m7 for the Optimistic (O) and
Missing Evidence (ME) variants of goals G4–G7 in Figure K1.
Example Lower  Confidence ! Higher Unknown
Variant (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (✓)
Original 0.003 0.022 0.576 0.391 0.008 0.001
Optimistic 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.988 0.001
Missing 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.015 0.973 0.001
Evidence
Table K4: Calculated belief mass m1 for goal G1 in Figure K1. Since the
computed confidence in a claim is defined as the confidence category in which
the highest proportion of the belief mass lies, confidence in G1 is medium (A3) in
the original example given in the paper and very high (A5) in both our Optimistic
and Missing Evidence variants.
Optimistic Example. In our Optimistic example, we put the bulk of
our belief mass in the very high (A5) confidence category.
Missing Evidence Example. In our Missing Evidence example, we
assume very high confidence in verification and validation for three re-
quirements, but very low confidence for the fourth. This simulates miss-
ing (or undermined) evidence of the satisfaction of the fourth require-
ment.
Analysis of Examples. Table K3 gives the belief mass figures for our
Optimistic and Missing Evidence examples. Table K4 gives the result-
ing belief mass in the system safety proposition (goal G1). Since in both
cases the vast bulk of the calculated belief mass lies in the very high (A5)
confidence category, we conclude that in both the Optimistic and Missing
Evidence variants the proposed technique assesses very high confidence
in the main safety claim. It is implausible to have nearly identical confi-
dence in the safety of both examples. It is also implausible to have very
high confidence in the safety of a system when there is only very low
confidence that one of its four safety requirements is met.
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Appendix L
Zhao, Zhang, Lu, and Zeng
Zhao, Zhang, Lu, and Zeng propose to calculate confidence using Bayesian
Belief Networks (BBNs) [25].
L.1 Proposed Technique
In the proposed technique, an analyst assesses confidence by:
1. Interpreting a given assurance argument as a sequence of Toulmin
arguments [34]
2. Creating a BBN by instantiating a given pattern for each instance
3. Supplying the requisite probabilities
Test for Argument Su ciency. The paper does not describe how to
use the calculated values to decide whether an argument justifies putting
a safety-critical system into service.
Illustrative Example. The paper illustrates the proposed technique
by applying it to “the typical safety argument.” Figure L1 shows its
example of the proposed BBN pattern. Tables L1 and L2 give the prob-
abilities for each node.
L.2 Replication
We had little di culty reproducing the example. Using the given figures
and node probability tables (NPTs), we also calculated 89% confidence
in node N11 “Justified Claim ‘system S is safe.’”
L.3 Hypotheses and Evidence
The paper describes its example as a “simplified case study” but does not
present information usually found in case study reports such as descrip-
tions of the study method, the data collected, and how these data relate
to the questions at issue [58]. On the basis of their example, the authors
cautiously deem their approach “a potentially helpful way towards the
measurement of confidence in assurance cases” [25].
L.4 Counterargument
We created two variants of the original example, namely Optimistic and
Pessimistic, that represent extreme assessments of confidence in the com-
pleteness of hazard identification. We use these examples to illustrate
that the proposed technique is not sensitive enough to this critical factor.
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Figure L1: An example “basic BBN for the typical safety argument,” taken
from [25]. For compactness, we represent BBNs nodes as rectangles.
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Table L1: Node values for the example shown in Figure L1.
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N3 Complete NotComplete
N2 Obtainable NotObtainable Obtainable NotObtainable
Present 1 1 0.8 1
NotPresent 0 0 0.2 0
Table L2: Node probability table for N12 in Figure L1, taken from [25]. The
paper notes that this conditional probability table is “very arbitrary” and “in
practice it should be discussed by experts and stakeholders” [25].
Case Present NotPresent
From paper 89.460% 10.540%
Optimistic 89.996% 10.004%
Pessimistic 86.404% 13.596%
Table L3: Calculated value of N11 (“Justified Claim ‘system S is safe’”) for the
original version presented in [25] and our Optimistic and Pessimistic variants.
Optimistic Example. Node N3 (“Coverage of Equivalence Partition
of Premises”) represents confidence in the completeness of the hazard
analysis (i.e., whether all significant hazards were identified). While the
original example shows 85% confidence in N3, our Optimistic variant uses
99.9%, leaving all other inputs and CPTs unchanged. This represents
extreme optimism in the completeness of the hazard identification.
Pessimistic Example. Our Pessimistic example is identical to the
original and Optimistic examples except that we assess the confidence in
N3 as 0.1%. This represents extreme pessimism in the completeness of
the hazard identification.
Analysis of Examples. Table L3 gives the calculated confidence in
safety for all three examples. It is not plausible that extreme changes
in confidence in hazard analysis would produce as small a change in
confidence in safety as the di↵erence between 90% and 86% indicates.
It is also implausible that anyone who completely distrusted a hazard
analysis would have 86% confidence that the analyzed system is safe.
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